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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Accounting Earnings and Chief Executive Officer Compensation: The Joint Effect of 
Earnings Contracting and Valuation Roles. (August 2007) 
Ying Cao, B.A., Renmin University of China; 
M.S., University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign; 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Thomas C. Omer 
 
 
This paper investigates the impact of accounting earnings on Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) compensation by examining how the valuation role and the contracting 
role of accounting earnings jointly determine the value of CEO total compensation. 
Current earnings are informative about the firms future cash flows and hence affect 
stock price, and the resulting price movement affects the value of CEO equity-based 
compensation. Thus, accounting earnings not only have a direct impact on CEO cash 
compensation, but also an indirect impact on CEO equity-based compensation due to 
earnings valuation role. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to provide empirical 
evidence that because of earnings valuation role, accounting earnings are an 
economically significant determinant of CEO total compensation. 
Prior accounting research testing predictions of agent theory has focused on CEO 
cash compensation even though total compensation is a more relevant measure. Thus, 
the significant result of earnings in CEO total compensation enables re-examination of 
agency predictions. I provide evidence that earnings (but not stock returns) are used in 
CEO total compensation consistent with the sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis. That 
iv 
 
is, accounting earnings receive less weight when earnings are relatively more volatile 
and when firms have significant growth opportunities. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
In this paper, I investigate the impact of accounting earnings on Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) compensation by examining how the valuation role and the contracting 
role of accounting earnings jointly determine the value of CEO total compensation. 
Total compensation includes cash compensation (salary and bonus), current year grants 
of stocks and stock options, and the value change in CEO beginning-of-the-year equity 
holdings. Earnings contracting role refers to the explicit use of accounting earnings in 
CEO compensation contract. Earnings valuation role refers to the ability of earnings to 
reflect firm value and affect stock price. I argue that news about accounting earnings 
affects stock price, and the resulting price movement affects the value of stocks and 
stock options held by CEOs. Therefore, accounting earnings not only have a direct 
impact on CEO cash compensation, which has been traditionally viewed as earnings 
contracting role, but also an indirect impact on CEO equity-based compensation due to 
earnings valuation role. In this paper I measure both the direct and the indirect impact 
of earnings, and document the overall impact of accounting earnings on CEO total 
compensation. To demonstrate the importance of incorporating the indirect impact of 
earnings I re-examine the classical sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis of agency 
theory which predicts that firms place more weight on a performance measure when it is 
more sensitive to managerial effort and when it is less noisy. Such evidence extends 
prior findings based exclusively on CEO cash compensation.  
                     
This dissertation follows the style of the Journal of Accounting and Economics. 
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A substantial accounting literature theoretically and empirically examines the use 
of accounting earnings in executive compensation contracts. Much of this work is 
motivated by the economic research on agency problems (for example, Ross, 1973; 
Mirrlees, 1976; Harris and Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979, 1982). Theoretical 
accounting work collectively demonstrates that accounting performance measures are 
used in managerial compensation to provide incentives, to filter common noise, and to 
balance efforts across multiple activities (see, for example, Banker and Datar, 1989; Paul, 
1992; Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993a, b; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Hemmer, 1996; 
Bushman Indjejikian and Penno, 2000; Datar, Kulp and Lambert, 2001).  
Concurrent with the development in analytical models, a large number of 
empirical studies test predictions of agency theory on the relative use of an accounting-
based performance measure (for example, accounting earnings) and a market-based 
performance measure (for example, stock returns) in executive cash compensation. One 
line of the research tests the sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis and finds empirical 
evidence generally consistent with the hypothesis (Lambert and Larcker, 1987; Clinch, 
1991; Sloan, 1993; Baber, Janakiraman and Kang, 1996). Another line of research tests 
the relative performance evaluation hypothesis, which predicts the use of a relative 
performance measure that is adjusted for market-wide or industry-wide fluctuations. 
Empirical evidence on the relative performance evaluation hypothesis is rather weak 
(Antle and Smith, 1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker, 
1992). A few studies examine how the characteristics of earnings affect its use in 
executive compensation, and find that firms rely more on accounting earnings in CEO 
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compensation when earnings are more persistent and more informative of stock prices 
(Baber, Kang and Kumar, 1998, 1999; Bushman, Engel and Smith, 2006). Researchers 
have also examined the role of other hypothesized determinants on the relative weights. 
These include industry group, existence of venture capital (Engel, Gordon and Hayes, 
2002), takeover protection and CEO power (Davilia and Penalva, 2006), institutional 
ownership (Dikolli, Kulp and Sedatole, 2006), and regulatory changes (Vafeas and 
Afxentiou, 1998; Perry and Zenner, 2001). In general, these studies provide evidence 
that firms use accounting earnings and stock returns in CEO compensation consistent 
with the predictions of agency theory.  
However, the majority of the empirical compensation research in accounting has 
focused on CEO cash compensation, but has ignored CEO equity-based compensation 
which includes current year grants of restricted stocks and stock options, and the value 
change in CEO beginning-of-the-year holdings of stocks and stock options. While 
evidence from cash compensation is important, it has become less relevant in the face of 
the explosion of equity-based compensation. Studies show that stock options 
experienced a seven fold increase for large U.S. public firms during 1980 and 1994 (Hall 
and Liebman, 1998), and replaced base salary as the largest single component in CEO 
total pay in the mid 1990s (Murphy, 1999). Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) document that 
the value of stock options represents 59% of CEO total pay in 2003, where total pay is 
the sum of cash compensation and the value of stocks and stock options granted in the 
current year. Along with the expansion of equity-based compensation is the tiny pay-for-
performance sensitivity (the change in a managers compensation for a change in firm 
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value) from cash compensation as compared to that from equity-based compensation. 
For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) show that CEO cash compensation changes by 
only two cents for each $1000 change in shareholders wealth, as compared to a $2.5 
change from CEO stock ownership. Subsequent studies such as Hall and Liebman 
(1998), Murphy (1999) and Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003) provide evidence 
consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990). An implication of the minimal pay-for-
performance sensitivity of cash compensation is that no matter how important 
accounting earnings are to CEO cash compensation, earnings impact on CEO total 
compensation is unlikely to be significant because the variation in cash compensation is 
too small to make a difference to CEO incentives. Consistent with this implication, 
Baber et al. (1996), Baber et al. (1998), Core et al. (2003), and Davila and Penalva (2006) 
provide evidence that conditional on stock returns, accounting earnings are insignificant 
to CEO total pay or total compensation even though earnings are significant to CEO 
cash compensation. In their survey paper, Bushman and Smith (2001, p243) call for an 
understanding of the decline in the market share of accounting information in top 
executive compensation, and point out that future compensation research on the role 
of accounting information in executive cash compensation must be prepared to defend 
its relevance in the face of this decline in market share. 
In this paper I investigate the role of accounting earnings in CEO total pay and 
total compensation by examining the joint impact of earnings valuation role and 
contracting role. The study makes three contributions to the accounting literature. First, 
it provides a comprehensive analysis of the impact of earnings on CEO total 
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compensation. It argues that as the practice of CEO compensation evolves, so do the 
ways accounting earnings influence CEO compensation. On the one hand, the traditional 
contracting role as reflected through earnings impact on CEO cash compensation has 
become smaller due to the explosion of equity-based compensation; On the other hand, 
however, earnings valuation role has become increasingly important in determining the 
value of CEO compensation due to the heavy reliance of CEO compensation on stock 
performance. To my knowledge, this study is the first to provide evidence that 
accounting earnings are an economically significant determinant of CEO total 
compensation. It also demonstrates that the economic significance comes entirely from 
earnings indirect impact. 
A second contribution of the paper is that it introduces an approach that enables 
examination of agency predictions for CEO total compensation. Only a few papers have 
included total pay or total compensation in testing agency predictions and most of them 
find earnings insignificant to CEO total pay or total compensation conditional on stock 
returns. Such evidence makes it difficult, if not impossible to further test how the weight 
on earnings varies with economic factors predicted by agency theory. However, tests 
based on total pay and total compensation are theoretically more relevant to agency 
models than tests based on cash compensation. This is because agency theory identifies 
managerial wealth, not annual cash compensation as the key variable of concern to 
managers (Baker, 1987; Bushman and Smith, 2001), and CEO total compensation is 
widely used as a proxy for managerial wealth in the economics and finance literatures 
(see, for example, Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and Liebman, 1998; Aggarawal and 
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Samwick, 1999, among others). Under the new approach which incorporates earnings 
indirect impact, I am able to find significant impact of earnings on CEO total 
compensation, which allows me to further test agency predictions in the context of CEO 
total compensation. To demonstrate the potential usefulness of the new approach, I re-
examine the classical sensitivity-noise hypothesis for CEO total compensation. I find 
strong evidence that firms use accounting earnings (but not stock returns) in a matter that 
is consistent with the agency prediction. Such evidence extends prior findings which are 
exclusively based on CEO cash compensation. 
A third contribution of the study is that it verifies a key assumption of recent 
earnings management research related to CEO equity-based compensation. This research 
provides evidence that earnings management activities are positively associated with 
CEO incentives arising from their equity-based compensation. The research suggests 
that CEOs manipulate earnings in order to maintain and/or realize the value of their 
equity-based compensation (see, for example, Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Bauman and 
Shaw; 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Efendi, 
Srivastava and Swanson, 2006). An underlying assumption of the research is that the 
impact of accounting earnings on CEO equity-based compensation is economically 
significant. While plausible, this assumption receives little support from the empirical 
compensation research. The current study provides evidence that verifies this assumption 
and supports the argument that earnings impact on CEO equity-based compensation 
may be large enough to induce CEOs to manipulate earnings.   
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While the research question of the paper is intuitive, it has been formally 
examined by analytical work such as Kim and Suh (1993) and Feltham and Wu (2000). 
These studies examine the optimal weights on accounting earnings and stock price in a 
managers incentive contract. The authors recognize that assuming market efficiency, 
two equilibriums are present in the setting: an optimal contracting equilibrium and a 
rational expectation equilibrium in which stock price is determined by all available 
information including earnings news. The authors demonstrate that in this setting the 
optimal relative weight on earnings is larger than in a traditional agency model that 
assumes only the optimal contracting equilibrium. This is because some compensation 
impacts associated with stock price are actually driven by earnings news, and 
incorporating the rational expectation equilibrium in the model allows attributing such 
impacts to accounting earnings. The authors suggest that researchers use the filtered 
price instead of the raw stock price in empirical tests in order to find the true weights 
on stock price and accounting earnings. The filtered price refers to the portion of stock 
price unaffected by accounting earnings.  
I apply two approaches in the empirical tests. Under the first approach I estimate 
a proxy for the filtered price and measure the relative weights on earnings and the 
filtered price. Under the second approach I examine the impact of stock returns around 
earnings announcement days on CEO compensation conditional on stock returns during 
non-earnings announcement days. Assuming that stock returns around earnings 
announcements are mostly driven by earnings news, a significant association between 
earnings-announcement-day returns and CEO compensation can be viewed as evidence 
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that earnings are important to CEO compensation conditional on stock returns. I further 
compute the percentage and dollar change of CEO compensation for a change in 
accounting earnings under the two approaches. 
I examine the relative weights on earnings and returns for six measures of CEO 
compensation. These are CEO cash compensation (salary and bonus), CEO equity grants 
(grants of restricted stocks and stock options in the current year), and the value change 
in CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings (stock holdings and option holdings). I 
also examine the relative weights for combined compensation items. These items are 
CEO total pay (sum of cash compensation, long term incentive plan payouts, other 
annual pay and equity grants), CEO total equity-based compensation (sum of equity 
grants and the value change in CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings), and CEO 
total compensation (sum of total pay and the value change in CEO equity holdings). 1  
The sample for the primary test is consisted of 12,326 CEO-year observations in 
ExecuComp database from 1993 to 2004. Consistent with my expectation, the results 
show that accounting earnings are important to all six measures of CEO compensation 
conditional on stock returns that are supposedly driven by non-earnings news. I 
summarize the results in terms of the change in CEO compensation for a one-standard-
deviation movement in accounting earnings.  Under the first approach, CEO cash 
compensation changes by 6.1% or $85,000 ($59,000) at the mean (median). These 
changes represent the direct impact of earnings.  Combining cash compensation and 
                                                
1 Note that both total pay and total equity-based compensation include equity grants. I examine total pay to 
compare my results with prior studies that also use this measure. I examine total equity compensation 
because it captures all compensation components that are directly linked to stock price. 
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equity grants, CEO total pay changes by 5.8%, or $271,000 ($127,000) at the mean 
(median). In contrast, CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings change by 130%, or 
$19.4 millions ($1.77 millions) at the mean (median). These amounts represent the 
majority of the indirect impact. 2 Combining the direct impact and the indirect impact, 
accounting earnings have a mean (median) effect of $19.62 millions ($1.87 millions) on 
CEO total compensation. While both the direct and the indirect impacts are statistically 
significant, the indirect impact dominates the direct impact in determining CEO 
compensation and generating incentives.  
 The results under the second approach show that for a one-standard-deviation 
movement in accounting earnings, CEO cash compensation, equity grants and total pay 
change for less than 2%. The direct impact of accounting earnings is around $17,000 
($12,000) at the mean (median). CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings change by 
26%, or $3.88 millions (.35 million) at the mean (median). Overall, CEO total 
compensation changes by $3.94 millions at the mean or $.38 million at the median. 
While these figures are less dramatic than those from the first approach, they still 
represent a large portion of CEO total compensation and appear economically significant. 
Because the information environment is continuous and multi-dimensional, it is hard if 
not impossible to measure the exact impact of earnings on stock price. In fact, the first 
approach may overestimate earnings valuation role and the second approach may 
underestimate the valuation role, implying that the indirect impact of earnings on CEO 
compensation is also measured with error. Because of this, I view the two approaches as 
                                                
2 Technically, the indirect impact stems from both equity grants and equity holdings; empirically however, 
the indirect impact is almost entirely driven by equity holdings. 
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providing estimates of the upper bound and lower bound of the impact of earnings on 
CEO compensation. 
Finally, to demonstrate the importance of incorporating the indirect impact in 
examining earnings overall impact on CEO compensation, I re-examine the sensitivity 
vs. precision hypothesis for CEO total compensation. The sensitivity refers to the 
change in a performance measure in response to a change in the agents action, and the 
precision refers to the lack of noise in the signal in measuring the agents action. 
While sensitivity is unobservable, it is generally believed that stock returns are more 
sensitive to managerial actions than accounting earnings for firms with significant 
growth opportunities. This is because stock returns are more capable of reflecting long-
term consequence of current managerial actions. Following Lambert and Larcker (1987), 
Sloan (1993) and Core et al. (2003), I use the book-to-market ratio to proxy for firms 
growth and examine whether the weight on stock returns (accounting earnings) is higher 
(lower) for firms with significant growth opportunities. I measure the precision of 
accounting earnings and stock returns by a relative noise ratio defined as the time series 
variance of accounting earnings over the time series variance of stock returns, and 
examine whether the weight on earnings (stock returns) decrease with the relative noise 
ratio. I find that accounting earnings receive less weight in CEO compensation when 
firms have more growth opportunities and when earnings are relatively more volatile 
compared to stock returns. On the other hand, stock returns receive more weight for 
growth firms in equity grants, total pay and total compensation models but not in the 
other models. Furthermore, stock returns appear to receive more weight when earnings 
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are relatively more volatile compared to stock returns. Thus, the results based on 
accounting earning but not stock returns support the sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis.  
The paper is organized as the following. In the next section I review the 
compensation literature that examines the relative weights on accounting earnings and 
stock returns. In section III, I discuss research designs and hypotheses. I describe the 
sample selection procedures, variable measurements and descriptive statistics in section 
IV. I report empirical results in section V and section VI and conclude in section VII. 
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 2.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
The executive compensation research is a branch of the corporate governance 
literature which examines the mechanisms that mitigate the principal-agent problems 
due to the separation of ownership and control of modern firms. Researchers have 
identified a number of corporate governance mechanisms. They include external forces 
such as product market competition, the market for corporate control, and labor market 
pressure, and internal forces such as compensation contracts, board of directors, 
concentrated ownership, debt contracts and securities law (see Shleifer and Vishny 1997 
for a review).  
The compensation research in accounting examines theoretically and empirically 
the role of accounting information in managerial compensation contracts. The theoretical 
work is largely inspired by classical principal-agent studies (Ross, 1973; Mirrlees, 1976; 
Harris and Raviv, 1979; Holmstrom, 1979, 1982) that model the trade-off between risk 
sharing and incentives in the optimal design of compensation contracts. These studies 
show that in an optimal compensation contract, the principal rewards the agent based on 
the outcome of one or more performance measures in order to induce the effort-averse 
and risk-averse agent to work in the best interests of the principal; however, the agent 
also wants to minimize whenever possible the risks shifted onto the agent because the 
agent will have to be compensated for these risks. The trade-off between incentives and 
risk sharing underlies the informativeness principle of Holmstrom (1979) which argues 
that any informative signal, regardless of how noisy it is, may be used in an optimal 
compensation contract as long as it provides additional information about the agents 
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actions. The informativeness principle supports the existence of complex structures of 
actual compensation contracts. For example, given that the objective of shareholders is 
to maximize firm value, stock-based performance measures seem to be sufficient in 
providing for incentive alignments. However, empirical evidence shows that other 
performance measures such as accounting profitability measures are extensively used in 
CEO cash compensation (See Murphy 1999 for a review). According to the 
informativeness principle, accounting earnings are useful not because investors care 
about earnings per se, but because information of accounting earnings reveals the 
managers actions beyond what can be revealed by stock returns.  
Following Holmstrom (1979) and other agency studies, accounting researchers 
have used agency models to analyze various accounting problems (see Lambert 2001 for 
a review). In their seminal paper, Banker and Datar (1989) show that the relative weights 
of two performance measures are proportional to their sensitivity and precision, where 
sensitivity refers to the expected change in a performance measure in response to a 
change in the agents action, and precision refers to the lack of noise in the 
performance measure. Following Banker and Datar (1989), subsequent analytical work 
has examined the agency problem using more complicated models (see for example, 
Paul, 1992; Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993a, b; Feltham and Xie, 1994; Hemmer, 1996; 
Bushman Indjejikian and Penno, 2000; Datar, Kulp and Lambert, 2001). Overall, this 
research demonstrates that in an optimal contract accounting performance measures are 
used to create incentives, to filter common noise, and to balance managerial actions 
14 
 
across multiple activities (see Lambert, 2001; Bushman and Smith, 2001, section 2.4 for 
a review).  
The development in agency theory has inspired an empirical literature in 
accounting that examines whether the use of performance measures varies along with the 
economic determinants as predicted by agency theory. Here, I provide a review of the 
literature that tests the weights on an accounting-based performance measure (for 
example, accounting earnings) and on a market-based performance measure (for 
example, stock returns) in executive compensation. One line of the research tests the 
trade-off between the sensitivity and precision of accounting earnings and stock returns 
in executive compensation. That is, whether a performance measure receives more 
weight when it is more sensitive and/or less noisy about managerial actions.  The 
precision of a performance measure is usually measured as the inverse of its time-series 
standard deviation or variance. The measurement of sensitivity is much less 
straightforward because it is unobservable. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that 
when firms have significant investment or growth opportunities, accounting earnings 
poorly reflect the long-term consequence of current managerial actions and thus are less 
sensitive to managerial actions than stock returns. Therefore, a testable hypothesis is 
that firms with significant growth or investment opportunities assign more (less) weight 
on stock returns (accounting earnings) in executive compensation contracts. Proxies for 
growth or investment opportunities include market-to-book ratio, price-earnings ratios, 
real growth in assets or sales, R&D expenditures, consensus investment choices of 
15 
 
growth fund mangers, length of product development cycles, or measures based on 
combinations of individual measures. 
In a seminal study that applies the above methodology, Lambert and Larcker 
(1987) examine whether the weight on stock returns relative to accounting earnings 
increases with the magnitude of firms growth proxy and the noise of accounting 
earnings relative to stock returns. The authors first run a regression of CEO cash 
compensation on accounting earnings (proxied by the changes in Return On Equity, 
ROE) and stock returns, and use the ratio of the slope coefficients (coefficient on stock 
returns divided by coefficient on earnings) as the dependent variable in a second 
regression where the independent variables are firms growth proxy and the relative noise 
ratio measured as the variance of the changes in ROE to the variance of stock returns.3 
Based a sample of 370 firms covered by Forbes annual compensation survey from 1970 
to 1984, the authors find that the coefficient on growth and the noise ratio are both 
positive after controlling for other relevant factors, indicating that firms place more 
weight on stock returns relative to earnings in CEO cash compensation when 
experiencing high growth and when accounting earnings are more volatile relative to 
stock returns. These findings are consistent with the trade-off hypothesis.  
Clinch (1991) examines whether the use of stock returns (accounting earnings) in 
executive compensation increases (decreases) with the magnitudes of firms R&D 
expenditures. The author runs a pooled cross sectional regression of executive 
compensation on ROE, stock return, and the interactions of these variables with R&D 
                                                
3 The authors use a latent variable approach to measure the growth and the noise variables in order to 
reduce the measurement error. 
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expenditures for a sample of 1,841 observations of 200 companies randomly selected 
between 1981 and 1985. The author finds that the weight on earnings in executive cash 
compensation increases for firms with high R&D whereas the weight on stock returns 
does not change with firms R&D level. In contrast, large firms with high R&D assign 
more (less) weight on stock returns (accounting earnings) as predicted by theory. The 
author also examines the trade-off hypothesis for executive total pay. Consistent with the 
hypothesis, high R&D firms place more weight on stock returns for all firm size. 
However, these high R&D firms also place more weight on accounting earnings (for the 
full sample and the small firm sample). Finally, while stock returns are always 
significant in the total pay regression, accounting earnings are insignificant for the full 
sample and the large firm sample. Overall, Clinch (1991) provides mixed evidence on 
the trade-off hypothesis. 
Baber, Janakiraman and Kang (1996) extend Lambert and Larcker (1987) and 
Clinch (1991) by developing a more comprehensive measure of firms investment 
opportunities using factor analysis techniques. Based on a pooled regression for a sample 
of 1,249 firms for year 1992 and 1993, the authors find that accounting earnings and 
stock returns are positively associated with CEO cash compensation, but the interaction 
between the investment opportunity proxy and accounting earnings and the interaction 
between the proxy and stock returns are insignificant. In CEO total pay model 
accounting earnings and its interaction with the investment opportunity proxy are 
statistically insignificant, but stock returns receive a positive weight which increases for 
firms with significant investment opportunities. Overall, Baber et al. provide some 
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evidence that stock returns but not accounting earnings are used in CEO compensation 
consistent with the sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis. 
Sloan (1993) predicts and finds evidence that earnings-based performance 
measures are used in addition to stock returns because they help to shield executives 
from market-wide factors that are beyond the executives control. Based on a pooled 
regression analysis of 6,132 observations for 538 firms covered by Forbes annual CEO 
compensation surveys from 1970 to 1988, Sloan finds that CEO cash compensation is 
more sensitive to earnings in firms where stock returns have a higher association with 
the market-wide noise in equity values, where accounting earnings have a higher 
association with the firm-specific signal in stock returns, and where earnings have a 
less positive or more negative association with the market-wide noise in equity values. 
Accounting earnings are proxied by changes in return on assets or changes in earnings 
per share. The market wide noise refers to the portion of stock returns determined by 
the general stock market which is beyond managerial control. The firm-specific signal 
in stock returns is the difference between raw stock returns and the market-wide noise.  
Another line of research examines the relative performance evaluation hypothesis 
(RPE), which argues that a contract based on a raw performance measure is less optimal 
than a contract based a relative performance measure which is adjusted for market-wide 
or industry-wide factors. This is because the RPE reduces unnecessary risks the agent 
would otherwise have to share and be compensated for. A common approach to test the 
RPE hypothesis is to run a regression of managerial compensation on raw stock returns 
and market (or industry) returns, and a significant negative coefficient on market (or 
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industry) returns is consistent with firms using RPE in CEO compensation. Similarly, 
researchers have also examined whether the RPE exists for accounting performance 
measures. A few papers test for the RPE for both accounting earnings and stock returns, 
and find little evidence of the existence of the RPE (see, for example, Antle and Smith, 
1986; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Janakiraman, Lambert and Larcker, 1992).4  
A number of papers examine how certain properties of accounting earnings affect 
the use of earnings in executive compensation conditional on stock returns (Baber, Kang 
and Kumar, 1998, 1999; Bushman, Engel and Smith, 2006). In general, these papers find 
that more persistent earnings or earnings that are more informative of stock returns as 
proxied by a higher earnings response coefficient (ERC) receive greater weight in CEO 
compensation. Leone, Wu and Zimmerman (2006) examine how one particular property 
of stock returns  the sign of stock returns affects the use of stock returns in CEO cash 
compensation. The authors find that CEO cash compensation is twice as sensitive to 
negative stock returns as it is to positive stock returns, consistent with boards of directors 
exercising discretion to reduce costly ex post settling up in cash compensation paid to 
CEOs.  
Other papers have examined how industry characteristics, firm characteristics 
(governance structure in particular), and regulatory changes affect the relative weights 
on earnings and stock returns in executive compensation. For example, Engel, Gordon 
and Hayes (2002) find that internet firms place less weight on earnings and more weight 
                                                
4 Rajgopal, Shevlin and Zamora (2006) provide one explanation to the lack of the RPE following 
theoretical work of Oyer (2004) who argues that CEOs reservation wages from outside employment 
opportunities vary with the economys fortunes which may make the absence of RPE optimal. 
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on stock returns in determining their CEOs compensation than do non-internet firms. In 
addition, compensation of firms with little or no venture capital influence displays 
significantly stronger association with accounting and stock performance measures than 
that of firms with more intense monitoring by venture capitalists, consistent with firms 
using incentive contracts as a supplement to direct monitoring. Dikolli, Kulp and 
Sedatole (2006) argue that high transient institutional ownership may induce managers 
to over-allocate efforts towards increasing current earnings and under-allocate efforts 
towards creating long-term firm value. Thus, firms with high transient institutional 
ownership may try to mitigate such managerial incentives by reducing the weight on 
accounting earnings in CEO compensation. The authors find evidence consistent with 
their hypothesis for CEO bonus pay. Davilia and Penalva (2006) show that 
compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protections and firms whose CEO 
possessing more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting 
earnings compared to stock returns, consistent with CEOs exerting their bargaining 
power through the design of the contract. Vafeas and Afxentiou (1998) examine how the 
1992 SEC rule on the disclosure of executive compensation affects CEO compensation 
and find that the weights on both earnings and stock returns in CEO cash compensation 
increase after implementation of the new disclosure rule. Perry and Zenner (2001) 
examine the impacts of two regulation changes occurred during 1992 and 1993, the new 
SEC disclosure rule and tax legislation limiting the deductibility of nonperformance-
related compensation over one million dollars [Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue 
Code]. The authors find that CEO compensation becomes more sensitive to stock returns 
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after 1993 especially for firms with million-dollar pay packages although changes in the 
sensitivity of compensation to accounting profitability measures do not show clear 
patterns.  
The board of directors not only relies on performance measures to determine the 
level of CEO compensation, but also refers to them in making a decision of whether to 
keep or fire the CEO. Studies such as Weisbach (1988) and Murphy and Zimmerman 
(1993) provide evidence that both accounting earnings and stock returns are relevant in 
predicting CEO turnover. Weisbach (1988) further finds that the board appears to rely 
more on accounting performance than stock performance to make its decision of keeping 
or firing the CEO. This is probably because stock returns embed the market 
expectations of the future including the possibility of the firm hiring a new CEO, leaving 
accounting earnings a cleaner measure of the incumbent CEOs performance. Finally, A 
few papers discuss methodological issues in examining the relative weights on earnings 
and stock returns in CEO compensation such as differential multi-period effects of 
different performance measures (Boschen, Duru, Gordon and Smith, 2003) and the 
simultaneity of performance and pay (Anderson, Banker and Ravindran, 2000).  
In sum, the empirical research provides rich evidence on the relative use of 
accounting earnings and stock returns in CEO compensation. Some studies find evidence 
consistent with the predictions of agency theory, others do not. At the minimum, 
however, almost all studies have documented a positive association between CEO cash 
compensation and accounting earnings conditional on stock returns. While evidence 
from CEO cash compensation is important, it has become less relevant in the face of the 
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explosion of equity-based compensation in the past several decades. Recent studies show 
that equity-based compensation has become a major part of CEO total pay. For example, 
Hall and Liebman (1998) document a seven fold increase in the value of stock option 
grants to CEOs as compared to a 100 percent increase in salary and bonus for a sample 
of Forbes 500 firms from 1980 to 1994. Murphy (1999) shows that during the mid 1990s, 
stock options replaced base salaries as the single largest component of CEO 
compensation for large US public companies (in all sectors except utilities). In year 1996, 
stock options account for 36% of CEO total pay as compared to 27% from base salary 
and 20% from bonus. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) show that this trend continues into 
the 21st century; the proportion of stock options in total CEO pay for S&P 500 firms has 
increased to 59% by 2003. 5  
Along with the explosion of stock options is the tiny pay-for-performance 
sensitivity from cash compensation as compared to equity-based compensation. The pay-
for-performance measures the change in the managers compensation for a change in 
shareholders wealth (or firms market value). For example, Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
show that during 1974 and 1986, CEO cash compensation changes only by 2 cents for 
each $1000 change of shareholders wealth, as compared to a $2.5 change in CEOs 
wealth due to stock ownership.  Hall and Liebman (1998) find that for a given change in 
firm value, the change in CEO equity-based compensation is 53 times greater than that 
in CEO cash compensation. More recently, Core et al. (2003) find that for 81% of the 
                                                
5 Note that the above evidence is concerned with CEO total pay which includes cash and grants of stocks 
and stock options but excludes the value change in CEO beginning-of-the-year holdings of stocks and 
options. The proportion of equity-based compensation will be even larger if equity holding is considered. 
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CEOs in their sample from 1993 to 2000, the incentives provided by cash compensation 
are less than 10 percent of the incentives provided by the CEOs stocks and stock 
options.  
An implication of the tiny pay-for-performance sensitivity of cash compensation 
is that no matter how important accounting earnings are to CEO cash compensation, 
earnings are unlikely to play a significant role in determining the value of CEO total 
compensation because the variation in CEO cash compensation is too small as compared 
with that of equity-based compensation to make a difference to CEO incentives. 
Consistent with this implication, Core et al. (2003) show that for a substantial majority 
of CEOs, cash compensation variance is less than 1 percent of the variance of the equity-
based compensation. In addition, a few studies directly include CEO total pay or total 
compensation in testing the relative weights on earnings and returns and most of them 
fail to find a significant association between accounting earnings and CEO total pay or 
total compensation conditional on stock returns. For example, Baber et al. (1996) find 
earnings significant in CEO cash compensation but not in CEO total pay, and that the 
interaction of earnings and investment opportunity proxy is statistically insignificant in 
both cases. Baber et al. (1998) find that earnings receive greater weight in CEO cash 
compensation when earnings are persistent, but earnings and its interaction with earnings 
persistence are statistically insignificant in CEO total pay. Similarly, Davila and Penalva 
(2006) find earnings and its interaction with relevant corporate governance factors 
significant for CEO cash compensation but insignificant for CEO total pay. Finally, 
Dikolliet et al. (2006) find earnings significant to CEO cash pay but not to CEO total pay 
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even though the interaction between earnings and the variable of interest (transient 
institutional ownership) is significant in the total pay model. In all these papers, stock 
returns are statistically significant in both CEO cash compensation and CEO total pay. 6 
Because of the small impact of cash pay on CEO incentives some economics and 
finance studies simply ignore cash compensation in examining the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity and view the sensitivity related to cash compensation as lost in the rounding 
error (Hall and Liebman, 1998; Baker and Hall, 2004). Bushman and Smith (2001, p243) 
comment that There is clearly a challenge here for accounting researchers to 
understand this decline in the market share of accounting information in top executive 
compensation, and It is also the case that future compensation research focuses on 
the role of accounting information in the cash compensation of top U.S. executives must 
be prepared to defend its relevance in the face of this decline in market share. 
The current study argues that earnings impact on CEO compensation goes 
beyond CEO cash compensation. Accounting earnings are informative about firms 
future cash flows and hence affect firm value, and news of accounting earnings usually 
has a significant impact on stock price. This valuation role of accounting earnings is 
viewed as a primary function of accounting earnings in the capital markets and has been 
extensively studied. (See Kothari, 2001, section 4.1.1 and section 4.3 for a detailed 
                                                
6 Perry and Zenner (2001) find that EPS is significantly positive but stock return is insignificant for CEO 
total pay for their sample. Boschen, Duru, Gordon and Smith (2003) examine the long-run (multi-year) 
effects of accounting earnings and stock returns on CEO compensation. In their replication of the 
traditional test that is based on annual changes in CEO compensation, they find evidence that accounting 
earnings are significant to CEO total pay conditional on stock returns. However, their sample consists of 
only 30 firms that have survived the sample period from 1959 to 1995, and the equity-based compensation 
was not a major component of CEO compensation for at least half of their sample period. In addition, their 
measure of compensation does not include the value change in CEO beginning-of-the-period equity 
holdings. 
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review.) As CEO equity-based compensation is directly linked to stock price, any price 
movement due to earnings news also affects the value of CEO equity-based 
compensation. Thus, accounting earnings not only have a direct impact on CEO cash 
compensation which has been viewed as earnings traditional contracting role, but also 
an indirect impact on CEO equity-based compensation due to earnings impact on stock 
price. The current study estimates both the direct and indirect impacts of earnings and 
provides evidence on the joint effect of earnings valuation role and contracting role on 
CEO total compensation. 
The study contributes to the empirical compensation literature by providing a 
comprehensive analysis of the overall impact of earnings on CEO compensation. It 
demonstrates that as the practice of CEO compensation evolves, so do the ways 
accounting earnings influence CEO compensation. On one hand, the traditional 
contracting role as reflected in earnings impact on CEO cash compensation has become 
less important in the presence of equity-based compensation; on the other hand, however, 
earnings valuation role has become increasingly important in CEO compensation due to 
the heavy reliance of CEO compensation on stock performance. To my knowledge, this 
study is the first to demonstrate the joint effect of earnings valuation role and 
contracting role on CEO compensation and the first to provide evidence that accounting 
earnings are an economically significant factor to CEO total compensation. Such 
evidence verifies the importance of accounting earnings in CEO compensation contract 
even in todays world where stocks and stock options dominate CEO compensation.  
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A second contribution of the study is that is introduces an approach that enables 
examination of agency predictions for CEO total compensation. As discussed earlier, 
most of the prior studies find earnings insignificant to CEO total pay or total 
compensation conditional on stock returns. Such evidence makes it difficult, if not 
impossible to further examine how the relative use of accounting earnings and stock 
returns varies with economic factors predicted by agency theory. However, tests based 
on total pay or total compensation are theoretically more relevant to agency models than 
tests based on cash compensation. Baker (1987) and Bushman and Smith (2001) point 
out that the slope coefficients on earnings and returns from a cash compensation 
regression do not have the theoretical interpretations derived from agency models 
because agency theory identifies managerial wealth, not current year cash compensation 
as the key variable of concern to managers. CEO total compensation, which includes not 
only cash and grants of stocks and options but also the reevaluation of CEO equity 
holdings is viewed as a proxy for managerial wealth and has been widely used in the 
economics and finance literatures (see, for example, Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Hall and 
Liebman, 1998; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999). Under the new approach which 
incorporates earnings valuation role in examining earnings influence on CEO 
compensation, I am able to find significant impact of earnings on CEO total 
compensation, which allows me to further test agency predictions in the context of CEO 
total compensation. To demonstrate the potential usefulness of the new approach, I re-
examine the classical sensitivity-noise hypothesis for CEO total compensation. I find 
strong evidence that firms use accounting earnings (but not stock returns) in a matter that 
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is consistent with the agency prediction. Such evidence extends prior findings which are 
exclusively based on CEO cash compensation. 
A third contribution of the study is that it verifies a key assumption of recent 
earnings management research related to CEO equity-based compensation. This research 
provides evidence that earnings management activities are positively associated with 
CEO incentives arising from their equity-based compensation. This research suggests 
that CEOs manipulate earnings in order to maintain and/or realize the value of their 
equity-based compensation. For example, Cheng and Warfield (2005) find that CEOs 
with greater equity incentives (measured as the value of CEO stock option grants, the 
value of their outstanding stock options, and their stock ownership) are more likely to 
report earnings that just meet or beat analysts forecasts, and are less likely to report 
large positive earnings surprise. This is consistent with managers reserving good news to 
avoid potential price drops due to future earnings disappointment. In addition, Cheng 
and Warfield (2005) and Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) find that CEOs with higher 
equity incentives are more likely to report income-increasing abnormal accruals and sell 
more shares following the year of high accruals. Bauman and Shaw (2006) extend the 
findings of Cheng and Warfield to the top five executives of US public firms and show 
that executives with a higher proportion of option grants in their total compensation are 
more likely to manipulate earnings. Focusing on extreme cases, Efendi, Srivastava and 
Swanson (2006) find a positive association between the amount of CEO in-the-money 
stock options and the propensity for the firm to misreport. Burns and Kedia (2006) find a 
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positive association between the sensitivity of CEO option portfolio to stock price and 
the propensity for the firm to misreport.  
Overall, this research suggests that incentives arising from CEO stocks and stock 
options may drive CEOs to manage earnings. An underlying assumption of this research 
is that the impact of accounting earnings on CEO equity-based compensation is 
economically significant. That is, changes in the value of CEO equity-based 
compensation due to changes in earnings are large enough to induce CEOs to manipulate 
earnings. While this assumption sounds plausible, it receives little support from the 
empirical compensation research. As discussed earlier, most studies in this research have 
focused on cash compensation, and the only few that touch on CEO equity-based 
compensation do not find a significant association between accounting earnings and 
CEO total pay or total compensation. In contrast, the current study provides evidence 
that accounting earnings are economically significant to CEO equity-based 
compensation and CEO total compensation. Thus, the study verifies the underlying 
assumption of the earnings management research and supports the argument that 
earnings impact on CEO equity-based compensation may be large enough to induce 
earnings management activities.   
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3.   RESEARCH DESIGN 
While the argument that accounting earnings affect CEO compensation via 
earnings valuation role is intuitive, it has been formally examined by analytical work 
such as Kim and Suh (1993) and Feltham and Wu (2000). These papers provide not only 
theoretical support to the current study but also guidance on the research design. Kim 
and Suh (1993) and Feltham and Wu (2000) use agency model to examine the optimal 
weights on accounting earnings and stock price in a compensation contract. An 
important feature of these papers is that they explicitly model earnings impact on stock 
price in determining the optimal relative weights. The authors assume that assuming 
market efficiency, two equilibriums are present when earnings and stock price are both 
used in a compensation contract: an optimal contracting equilibrium and a rational 
expectation equilibrium in which stock price is determined by all available information 
including accounting earnings. 7 Kim and Suh (1993) point out because stock price 
impounds earnings information the informativeness of stock price in a compensation 
contract should depend on the information price conveyed incremental to earnings. The 
authors call the price signal conveying the incremental information the filtered price 
because theoretically it can be obtained by filtering earnings information from the raw 
stock price. The authors solve for the efficient market price and the optimal weights on 
the filtered price and accounting earnings under the dual equilibrium conditions 
assumption. They document that the relative weight of earnings to the filtered price is 
                                                
7 Also see Diamond and Verrecchia (1982), Dye (1985), Paul (1992), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) and 
Bushman and Indjejikian (1993b), Chen, Hemmer and Zhang (2007) that assume two equilibriums in 
examining the agency problem. 
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larger than the relative weight of earnings to the raw price. This is because a portion of 
the compensation impact of stock price is actually attributable to earnings; using the raw 
price double-counts the impact of stock price and underestimates the impact of earnings.  
Feltham and Wu (2000) assume that stock price is jointly determined by a public 
report (for example, accounting earnings), non-observable private information and 
random supply of noise traders, and they use filtered price to proxy for the non-
observable, private information which is orthogonal to the information in the public 
report. The authors examine how alternative types of private information determine the 
equilibrium market price and the relative weights on the public report and the filtered 
price. Like Kim and Suh (1993), Feltham and Wu (2000) provide that the relative 
weights on a public report and the filtered price differ from those on a public report and 
the raw price; the raw price captures not only investors private information but also 
information in the public report, creating a double counting problem. Kim and Suh 
(1993) and Feltham and Wu (2000) suggest that researchers use the filtered price in 
empirical tests to avoid overstating the relative weight on stock price. While their focus 
is on the correct weight on stock price, the use of the filtered price will also yield the 
correct weight on earnings because in such a setting the weight on earnings reflects the 
full impact of accounting earnings on CEO compensation including the impact that 
would otherwise be subsumed by the raw stock price.  
I apply two approaches in the empirical tests. Under the first approach I follow 
the suggestion of Kim and Suh (1993) and Feltham and Wu (2000) by estimating a 
proxy for the filtered price. Under the second approach I do not directly utilize the 
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filtered price concept; instead, I estimate earnings impact on stock price and then 
compute the changes in CEO compensation corresponding to such price impact of 
earnings.  
3.1.   Approach 1  
Under the first approach, I run a regression of annual stock returns on changes in 
annual accounting earnings and view the residual term as a proxy for the filtered price.  
RETi,t = a0 + a1∆Ei,t + ei,t                                                                                     (1)                             
Where RETi,t is the annual buy-and-hold return of firm i in year t, and ∆Ei,t is the 
change in firm is EPS from year t-1 to year t scaled by share price at the beginning of 
year t. The residual term ei,t represents information content of stock price orthogonal to 
accounting earnings, and is viewed as a proxy for the filtered price. 8 Second, I estimate 
the relative weights on earnings and the filtered price for various compensation models. 
For simplicity I only write out models of individual compensation components but not 
the combined compensation components.  
∆Cashi,t = b10 + b11* ∆Ei,t + b12* ei,t + u1i,t                                                                 (2a)   
∆Equity_grantsi,t = b20 + b21* ∆Ei,t + b22* ei,t + u2i,t                                                   (2b)   
∆Equity_holdingsi,t = b30 + b31* ∆Ei,t + b32* ei,t + u3i,t                                               (2c)   
 
Where ∆Cashi,t is the change in CEO cash compensation in year t, 
∆Equity_grantsi,t is the value change in grants of stocks and stock options in year t, and 
∆Equity_holdingsi,t is the value change in CEO equity holdings at the beginning of year t. 
Take model (2c) for example. The coefficient on the filtered price (b32) reflects the 
impact of stock price on CEO equity holdings free of the influence of earnings news. 
                                                
8 In the empirical tests I also control for years and industries in estimating model (1) and all compensation 
models.   
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The coefficient on accounting earnings (b31) reflects earnings full impact on the value of 
CEO equity holdings and represents a portion of the indirect impact of earnings. Another 
portion of the indirect impact comes from earnings impact on CEO equity grants, as 
represented by b21. Finally, the coefficient on earnings in model (2a) (b11 reflects 
earnings full impact on CEO cash compensation, which is the indirect impact.  These 
models differ from models used in prior studies based on the raw stock returns: 
∆Cashi,t = c10 + c11*∆Ei,t + c12*RETi,t + u1i,t                                                     (3a) 
∆Equity_grantsi,t = c20 + c21*∆Ei,t + c22*RETi,t + u2i,t                                      (3b) 
∆Equity_holdingsi,t = c30 + c31*∆Ei,t + c32*RETi,t + u3i,t                                   (3c) 
 
To see the difference between models (2a-2c) and models (3a-3c), note that the 
coefficient on earnings in model (3c) (c31) reflects earnings impact on CEO equity 
holdings conditional on raw stock returns. The coefficient is unlikely to be significant 
because any potential impact of earnings on CEO equity holdings may have been 
subsumed by raw stock returns. Model (2c) avoids the double counting problem by using 
a proxy for stock return that is orthogonal to accounting earnings, allowing the 
coefficient on accounting earnings (b31) to pick up the full impact of earnings on CEO 
compensation. I expect earnings to be important to the value of CEO equity grants and 
CEO equity holdings conditional on stock returns that are driven by non-earnings news. 
That is, I predict b31 and b21 to be significantly positive. Prior studies have already found 
accounting earnings to be important to CEO cash compensation conditional on raw stock 
returns. To the extent that some of the positive association between CEO cash 
compensation and stock returns may come from earnings influence on stock returns, I 
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expect the direct impact identified by Model (2a) to be even greater than what has been 
previously documented, i.e., I expect b11 to be larger than c11.  
3.2.   Approach 2 
The first approach is based on an association research design and implicitly 
assumes that the correlation of returns and earnings is driven by earnings impact on 
stock returns. However, the correlation is a noisy proxy of earnings valuation role as 
covariance does not necessarily imply causality. Consequently, the first approach may 
overstate the valuation role of earnings and hence earnings impact on CEO 
compensation arising from earnings valuation role. Approach 2 addresses this issue by 
taking advantage of an event study design. Assuming that stock movements around 
earnings announcement are mostly driven by earnings news, I examine the association 
between CEO compensation and stock returns around earnings announcement 
conditional on non-earnings-announcement-day stock returns. A significant association 
is viewed as evidence that earnings are important to CEO compensation conditional on 
stock returns driven by non-earnings news. Based on results from this test I provide 
alternative estimate of earnings direct and indirect impact on CEO compensation. 
In the first part of Approach 2, I run the following set of regressions for each 
compensation model. A demonstration using CEO equity holdings is shown below. 
∆Equity_holdingsi,t = d0 + d1*NON_EA_RETi,t + ui,t                                                       (4a) 
∆Equity_holdingsi,t = d0 + d2*EA_RETi,t + ui,t                                               (4b) 
∆Equity_holdingsi,t = d0 + d3*NON_EA_RETi,t + d4*EA_RETi,t+ ui,t            (4c) 
 
Where EA_RETi,t is the sum of the three-day cumulative raw returns around all 
earnings announcements of firm i in year t. That is,  
33 
 
EA_RETi,t, =∑
=
4
1
,,_
j
jtiRETCUM        (5) 
Where CUM_RETi,j,t  is the three-day (-1,0,1) cumulative raw stock return around 
the jth earnings announcement of firm i in year t. Thus, EA_RET represents a 12-day 
cumulative return for each firm-year. I treat the difference between annual stock return 
and EA_RET as stock return driven by non-earnings information, and call it 
NON_EA_RET.  
Model (4a) measures the impact of non-earnings-announcement-day stock return 
on CEO compensation. It serves as a benchmark and I expect d1 to be significantly 
positive. Model (4b) examines the impact of EA_RET on CEO compensation and I 
expect d2 to be significantly positive. Model (4c) tests for the significance of EA_RET 
conditional on NON_EA_RET. This test controls for the possibility that the significance 
of EA_RET in Model (4b) may come from the correlation of EA_RET and 
NON_EA_RET. I expect d3 and d4 in Model (4c) to be both significantly positive. 
Assuming that EA_RET is driven by earnings news, a positive d4 implies that earnings 
news is significant to CEO compensation conditional on stock return driven by non-
earnings news. 
In the second part of Approach 2 I re-examine the compensation impact of 
earnings based on an estimate of the short-window ERC. The ERC measures the 
markets reaction to unexpected earnings changes. The higher the ERC, the stronger 
reaction the market has towards earnings news, indicating a more important valuation 
role of earnings. I use changes in quarterly earnings as a proxy for unexpected earnings 
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changes and estimate the ERC based on the following short-window return-earnings 
model:  
CUM_RETi,t,j = a0 + a1∆QEi,t,j + ei,t,j                                                             (6)         
Where ∆QEi,t,j  is firm is jth quarter EPS in year t minus the EPS of the same 
quarter in year t-1, scaled by stock price at the end of the earlier quarter. Next I rewrite 
Model (4c) by replacing EA_RET with CUM_RET, and further replacing CUM_RET 
with the right hand side of model (6). That is, 
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Define tiQE ,∆ as the average quarterly earnings, that is, ∑
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The above can be written as: 
 
titititi errorQEdaRETEANONdConstholdingsEquity ,,41,3, *4__*_ +∆++=∆  (7)                                  
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Intuitively, a1 reflects stock movements in response to earnings news at a single 
earnings announcement, and 4a1 measures stock movements in response to earnings 
news from all four earnings announcements during a firms fiscal year, or stock 
movements in response to annual earnings news. As the coefficient d4 reflects the 
change in CEO compensation for a change in price due to annual earnings news, 4a1d4 
reflects the impact of annual earnings news on CEO compensation.  
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Approach 2 is a conservative test in that it may underestimate earnings valuation 
role and hence the indirect impact of earnings on CEO compensation. One source of the 
underestimation is the existence of the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD), the 
markets delayed reaction to earnings news. Empirical studies have found that the PEAD 
may extend for several quarters after earnings announcement, and the phenomenon is 
persistent and economically significant (see Kothari 2001, section 4.4.2.1 for a review). 
To the extent that the markets response to earnings announcement continues for months 
instead of ending one day after earnings announcement, Approach 2 may fail to capture 
the markets full response to earnings news. Thus, the ERC will be underestimated and 
so will be the compensation impact of earnings calculated from the ERC.  
Second, some earnings-related information (firms earnings forecast, non-
earnings- announcement-day conference calls, press news, and analysts earnings 
forecasts, etc) may preempt quarterly earnings announcement and thus reduce the 
markets reaction around the subsequent earnings announcement. Analytical research 
argues that the quality or informativeness of predisclosure is inversely related to 
investors reliance on a subsequent earnings announcement (see, for example, 
Holthausen and Verrecchia, 1988; Demski and Feltham, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996). 
Empirical studies such as Shores (1990), Gelb and Zarowin (2002), and Frankel and Li 
(2004) provide evidence consistent with these analytical findings.9 To the extent that the 
market reacts to earnings news prior to earnings announcement, EA_RET may be 
underestimated as a portion of the stock returns driven by earnings news may have been 
                                                
9 Francis, Schipper and Vincent (2002) also examine the issue but provide mixed evidence on this issue. 
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absorbed by NON_EA_RET. Therefore, earnings valuation role and its compensation 
impact arising from the valuation role will also be understated. As a matter of fact, 
because the information environment is continuous and multidimensional, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible to capture the exact impact of earnings on stock price. 
Therefore I view Approaches 1 and 2 as complements in the sense that they provide 
estimates of the upper bound and lower bound of the compensation impact of earnings.  
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4. SAMPLE SELECTION, MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES AND 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
4.1.   Sample Selection 
I obtain an initial sample of 20,113 CEO-year observations in the ExecuComp 
database from 1993 to 2004. Similar to Sloan (1993), Baber et al. (1998) and Core et al. 
(2003), I require that the CEO provide full service in the current year and the prior year 
which reduces the sample to 13,870 observations. I eliminate 1,393 observations that do 
not have relevant compensation data. I then combine this sample with the Compustat 
database and CRSP database and require valid data on annual EPS, changes in annual 
EPS and annual stock returns. These procedures eliminate another 151 observations. The 
final sample consists of 12,326 CEO-year observations representing 2,376 firms from 
1993 to 2004. 
4.2.   Compensation Variables 
I obtain data on CEO cash compensation, equity grants, and total pay directly 
from ExecuComp database. The value change in CEO stock holdings is measured as the 
number of shares held by the CEO at the beginning of the year multiplied by annual buy-
and-hold stock return calculated from the monthly stock returns in CRSP. The change in 
the value of CEO option holdings is measured as the number of options held by the CEO 
at the beginning of the year multiplied by an estimate of the change in the option price 
per share during the year. I follow Core et al. (2003) in estimating the change in the 
option price per share. Specifically, I compute the Black-Scholes value of option per 
share at the beginning of year t, and then estimate a pro forma option value per share 
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at the end of year t.  I treat the difference between the two as the value change per share 
of CEO beginning-of-the-year option holdings. I apply the one-year approximation 
approach (OA) of Core and Guay (2002) in computing the Black-Sholes value of 
option per share at the beginning of year t. The OA approach allows accurate estimate of 
the value and sensitivity of employee stock options using only the current years 
corporate proxy statement. Core and Guay (2002) show the OA approach captures more 
than 99 percent of the variation of the values and sensitivities of employee stock options. 
The Black-Scholes model requires six parameters to calculate the option value: stock 
price, exercise price, time-to-maturity, stock volatility, dividend yield and interest rates. 
I obtain all parameters of the Black-Scholes model except the interest rates from 
ExecuComp database. The stock volatility is measured as the standard deviation of stock 
price over the past 60 months and the dividend yield is measured as the average dividend 
yield over the past three years. I obtain the interest rates information from the Federal 
Reserves Bank Report database in WRDS which is based on the Federal Reserve 
Boards H.15 release that contains selected interest rates for U.S. treasuries. To calculate 
the pro forma option price at the end of year t, I use the same parameters used to 
calculate the option price at the beginning of year t with two exceptions: I reduce the 
time-to-maturity of each option group by one year,10 and replace stock price at the 
beginning of year t with stock price at the end of year t. This method allows researchers 
                                                
10 The OA approach classifies options into three groups: options granted in the current year, previously 
granted unexercisable options and previously granted exercisable options. Following Core et al (2003) I 
modify the OA approach by assuming time-to-exercise equal to 70 percent of the stated time-to-maturity. 
Therefore in calculating the value of previously granted options, I reduce the time-to-maturity of each 
category of stock options by 0.7 year.  
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to focus on the variation in option value due to stock price changes and ignore variation 
due to other factors such as interest rates.  
Following Baber et al. (1998) and Core et al. (2003) I use unexpected percentage 
changes in CEO compensation in the empirical tests to remove the effect of scale 
differences in compensation across the sample. Specifically, I use actual compensation 
in year t-1 to proxy for expected compensation in year t for cash compensation, equity 
grants and total pay. Thus,  
Changes in CEO cash compensation:  
∆Cashi,t = (Cashi,t-Cashi,t-1)/ Cashi,t-1; 
 
Changes in CEO equity grants:  
∆Grantsi,t = (Grantsi,t-Grantsi,t-1)/Grantsi,t-1; 
 
Changes in CEO total pay:  
∆Total_payi,t = (Total_payi,t  Total_payi,t-1)/Total_payi,t-1; 
 
Where Cash is salary and bonus, Grants is the Black_Scholes value of current 
year grants of restricted stocks and stock options, and Total_pay is the sum of Cash and 
Grants. However, the above approach does not apply to the value change in CEO equity 
holdings because it assumes negative compensation in year t when stock returns are 
negative, even though expected returns and expected compensation are always positive. 
Following Core et al., I assume a 10% expected return on CEO stock holdings and 
option holdings. Thus, the changes in CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings, 
∆Equity_holdings are the sum of the value change in CEO stock holdings (chg_stk) and 
the value change in CEO option holdings (chg_opt) minus 10% of the value of CEO 
stock holdings and CEO option holdings at the beginning of year t. The changes in CEO 
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total equity-based compensation, ∆Total_equity are the changes in CEO equity holdings 
as defined above plus the changes in CEO equity grants from t-1 to t. Finally, the 
changes in CEO total compensation, ∆Total_comp are the changes in CEO equity 
holdings plus the changes in CEO total pay. All compensation variables are scaled by the 
expected compensation for year t so that all dependent variables are in percentage terms. 
 
Changes in the value of CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings: 
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4.3.   Other Key Variables 
 Similar to Sloan (1993) and Core et al. (2003), I define accounting earnings as 
annual basic EPS excluding extraordinary items (Compustat annual data item 58), and 
changes in annual EPS (∆E) as EPS in year t minus EPS in year t-1, scaled by share 
price at the end of t-1. The quarterly changes in earnings (∆QE) are measured as 
quarterly basic EPS excluding extraordinary items (Compustat quarterly data item 19) in 
year t minus EPS of the same quarter in year t-1, scaled by share price at the end of the 
earlier quarter (Compustat quarterly data item 14). All EPS variables and stock price are 
adjusted for stock dividends and stock splits. Annual stock return (RET) is the raw 
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annual buy-and-hold return calculated from monthly stock returns in CRSP database. 
The percentage changes of the compensation items can vary dramatically due to small 
denominators. Therefore, following Baber et al. (1996) and Core et al (2003), I 
winsorize all the percentage change variables at the top and bottom 0.5 percent. I also 
winsorize changes in EPS and RET to control for outliers in the independent variables. 
4.4.   Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the full sample. In Panel A, the mean 
values of CEO stock holdings and option holdings are $128.93 millions and $20.15 
millions, respectively. The corresponding median values are $7.86 millions and $5.70 
millions, respectively. Overall, CEO equity holdings vary dramatically across the sample 
especially in the upper quartile. In addition, the variance and maximum value of stock 
holdings is 20-30 times those of option holdings. In Panel B, the mean (median) CEO 
cash compensation is $1.41 millions ($0.98 million). The cash compensation is relatively 
tightly distributed with a standard deviation of $1.87 millions. The equity grants have a 
mean (median) value of $2.83 millions ($0.80 million) and a standard deviation of 
$11.79 millions, which is more than four times its mean, and more than six times the 
standard deviation of cash compensation. Consistent with prior studies that find option 
grants a major component of CEO total pay, the value of option grants is 168% (63%) of 
cash compensation at the mean (median). The grants of restricted stocks are much less 
popular: more than 75 percent firms do not grant stocks to its CEO in an average year. 
Combining cash compensation and equity grants, CEO total pay has a mean (median) 
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value of $4.65 millions ($2.18 millions) and a standard deviation of $12.52 millions. 
Obviously, most of the variation in CEO total pay comes from the equity grants.  
 The mean (median) value change in CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings 
is $22.52 millions ($.58 million), which is around 480% (27%) that of total pay. 11 
Unlike total pay, the value change in equity holdings can be negative; more than one 
quarter of the CEOs loses money in equity holdings in a given year. The standard 
deviation of the value change in CEO equity holdings is $637 millions. Further analysis 
(not tabulated) shows that the dollar value at the 5th and 95th percentiles are negative $36 
millions and positive $69 millions, respectively. This range is much larger than that on 
CEO total pay ($0.4 million at the 5th percentile and $15 millions at the 95th percentile). 
Thus, consistent with Jensen and Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman (1998) and Core et 
al. (2003), the value change in CEO equity holdings is the major source of the variation 
in CEO total compensation. The value change in equity holdings also determines the 
mean, min and max values of CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total 
compensation. For example, the mean values of total equity-based compensation and 
total compensation are $25.35 millions and $27.16 millions, respectively, which are very 
close to the mean value ($25.22 millions) of the value change in CEO equity holdings. 
                                                
11 Note that the change in the value of equity holdings calculated may be different from the true value 
change. In the case of stock holdings, the CEO may have sold the shares during the year and the realized 
return may be different from the actual annual return. In the case of option holdings, the CEOs may 
exercise their vested options and sell the stocks during the year, and the selling price may be different 
from the year-end price used to calculated option value per share. In addition, because I only allow stock 
price and time-to-maturity to change in the Black-Sholes model and require other variables (interest rate, 
return volatility, dividend yield) to remain unchanged, the computed value change differ from the actual 
value change in options.  
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The median value of equity holdings is .58 million which is lower than both the cash 
compensation and equity grants. 
 Panel C reports descriptive statistics of the percentage changes in CEO 
compensation items. All the percentage changes are significantly positive at the mean. 
Cash compensation increases by 16% per year. The annual increases of equity grants, the 
value change in CEO equity holdings and total equity-based compensation are 66%, 
65% and 69%, respectively. The annual change of total pay (42%) is about the average 
of that of cash compensation and equity grants. Overall, CEO total compensation 
increases by 38% in an average year over the sample period. At the median the increase 
of CEO compensation is between 5% and 11% except for the value change in equity 
holdings and the total equity-based compensation. The unexpected change in CEO 
equity holdings is -14% which implies that the stocks and options held by CEOs earn a 
median return of 8.6%. (Recall that I assume 10% expected return on CEO stock 
holdings and option holdings.) The median change in CEO total equity-based 
compensation is zero, resulting from the positive change in equity grants and the 
negative change in equity holdings. Finally, evidence in Panel C confirms findings in 
Panel B that the value change in CEO equity holdings is the driving force of the 
variation in CEO total compensation; the standard deviation of the value change in 
equity holdings (6.35) is twice that of equity grants and more than 13 times that of cash 
compensation.    
 Panel D reports descriptive statistics of other selected variables. The mean 
(median) EPS is $1.07 ($1.03), and mean and median change in EPS (scaled by share 
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price) is $0.01. Firms have an average ROE of 0.10. These accounting variables are 
symmetrically distributed around their respective medians. The sample consists of large 
firms with mean (median) market capitalization of $6.7 billions ($1.5 billions) and 
relatively low book-to-market ratios (0.50 at mean and 0.43 at median). The mean and 
median annual stock returns of the sample are 0.18 and 0.12, respectively.  
 Panel E of Table 1 reports the Pearson (upper) and Spearman (lower) correlations 
of selected variables. Cash compensation and the value change in CEO equity holdings 
are positively correlated (Pearson correlation .23), but their correlations with equity 
grants are much lower (Pearson correlation .03 for cash compensation and .08 for equity 
holdings). Note that the correlation between equity holdings and total equity-based 
compensation and between equity holdings and total compensation are above .85, 
indicating that these latter composite compensation items are dominated by the value 
change in CEO equity holdings.  Importantly, the change in EPS is significantly 
correlated with the value change in CEO equity holdings, CEO total equity-based 
compensation and CEO total compensation (Pearson correlations .31, .31 and .32, 
respectively). These positive correlations are consistent with the argument that 
accounting earnings are linked to CEO equity-based compensation and CEO total 
compensation. Finally, the correlation between equity grants and stock 
returns/accounting earnings are relatively low (Pearson correlation 0.07 for accounting 
earnings and .10 for stock returns). Thus, accounting earnings and stock returns may not 
be the best explanatory variables to the value change in equity grants.  
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1.   Replication of Prior Findings 
 
In Table 2 I report replication results on the relative weights on accounting 
earnings and raw stock returns in CEO compensation. Consistent with prior findings 
(Baber et al., 1996; Baber et al., 1998, 1999; Core et al., 2003, among others), 
accounting earnings are significant in explaining CEO cash compensation (0.25, p-value 
<.001) but are insignificant in explaining equity grants (-0.23, p-value 0.19), the value 
change in CEO equity holdings (-0.43, p-value 0.30), and CEO total pay (0.00, p-
value=1). Earnings are negatively associated with CEO total equity-based compensation 
(-1.33, p-value 0.003) and CEO total compensation (-1.39, p-value=0.001).12 Overall, 
results in table 2 confirm previous findings that conditional on raw stock returns 
accounting earnings receive a significant positive weight in CEO cash compensation but 
not in CEO equity-based compensation or CEO total compensation.   
 
5.2.   Empirical Test Results  Approach 1 
 
Table 3 reports test results of Approach 1. Panel A provides estimates of the 
filtered price based on a pooled cross sectional regression of annual returns on 
accounting earnings with year and industry (two-digit SIC code) indicators (Model 1). 
The R2 of the return-earnings regression is 14% (not reported). Thus, while accounting 
earnings explain some contemporaneous stock returns, a significant portion of stock 
returns remains unexplained. The mean value of the filtered price is zero by default. 
Apart from the mean and median values, the distribution of the filtered price is very 
                                                
12 These negative associations should be interpreted with caution because earnings are not negatively 
associated with any individual component of CEO equity-based compensation.  
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similar to that of the raw stock return. For example, the standard deviation of the filtered 
price is 0.49 which is slightly lower than that of the raw return (0.53); the full range of 
the filtered price is 6.85, comparable to that of the raw return (6.06). The Pearson 
correlation between the filtered price and accounting earnings is zero by design. The 
correlation between the filtered price and the raw stock return is .91 (Pearson) or .85 
(Spearman). In addition, the correlations between various compensation items and the 
filtered price are similar to those between the compensation items and the raw stock 
return. These results suggest that the filtered price preserves key statistical features of 
the raw stock returns. Overall, evidence in Panel A supports the use of the estimated 
residual from Model (1) as a proxy for the filtered price.  
 Panel B of Table 3 reports results from regressions of CEO compensation on 
earnings and the filtered price. Panel C demonstrates the computation of the percentage 
changes and dollar changes in CEO compensation for a one-standard deviation 
movement in accounting earnings. First note that the independent variable in the 
compensation model, the filtered price, is the residual term from the return-earnings 
regression model. An endogeneity problem may be present if the residual term in the 
return-earnings model is correlated with the error term in the compensation model. Thus, 
I first perform the Hausman test for each compensation model. Based on the test results I 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the filtered price is orthogonal to the error term of 
the compensation model. Therefore, the filtered price can be viewed as an exogenous 
variable in the compensation model and the OLS provides consistent estimates. The 
coefficient estimates are thus based on pooled cross-section OLS regressions with year 
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and industry indicators (two-digit SIC code) (omitted from the table). The t-statistics are 
based on Rogers standard errors which control for serial correlation and 
heteroscedasticity. 
In the cash compensation model the coefficients on earnings and the filtered 
price are 0.43 and 0.20 respectively, and both are highly significant (p-value<0.001). 
Thus, for each dollar increase in EPS, CEO cash compensation will increase by 43%. 
Recall that the standard deviation of the change in EPS is 0.14 (Table 1, panel D). 
Therefore, a CEO whose firm improves its accounting performance by one standard 
deviation will see an increase in her cash compensation of 6.1%, or $85,000 ($59,000) at 
the mean (median) (see Panel C of Table 3 for the computation). These figures represent 
earnings direct impact on CEO compensation. Consistent with my expectation, earnings 
coefficient in the cash compensation model in Table 3 is higher than that in the cash 
compensation model with raw stock return (.25 in Table 2, Model A). Panel B of Table 3 
also reports the lower bound and upper bound of the coefficient estimate at 95% 
confidence level. The ranges are relatively narrow for all models except the equity grants 
model, suggesting that the inferences drawn from the point estimates are reasonably 
reliable.  
The coefficients on accounting earnings and the filtered price in the equity grants 
model are .37 and .64, respectively. While they are statistically significant, the low R2 of 
the model (1.7%) implies that accounting earnings and stock returns are probably not 
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good explanatory variables for the value changes in equity grants.13 The percentage 
change in the value of equity grants is 5.2%, or $146,000 ($41,000) at the mean (median) 
value for a one-standard-deviation movement in earnings. The earnings coefficient in the 
model of the value change in CEO equity holdings is 9.29 (p-values<0.001), which 
translates into a percentage change of 130% or a dollar change of $19.39 millions ($1.77 
millions) at the mean (median), for a movement of one-standard-deviation in earnings. 
Theoretically, the indirect impact comes from both CEO equity grants and CEO equity 
holdings. Empirically however, equity holdings dominate equity grants in driving the 
value change in CEO compensation and are the main source of the indirect impact. 
Taking together the indirect impact of earnings amounts to $19.53 millions ($1.81 
millions) at the mean (median).14  Accounting earnings are also important to CEO total 
pay (.41, p-value<.001). A one-standard-deviation movement in earnings will change 
CEO total pay by 5.8%, or $271,000 ($127,000) starting from its mean (median) value. 
These results are in contrast to prior studies that find earnings insignificant in explaining 
CEO total pay. Finally, the impact of earnings on CEO total compensation is $19.62 
millions ($1.87 millions) at the mean (median) for a one-standard-deviation movement 
in accounting earnings. Obviously, it is the indirect impact of earnings that makes 
earnings an important determinant of CEO total compensation.  
                                                
13 For example, a firm may issue stock options when it has significant growth opportunities but has weak 
accounting performance and/or market performance at present. A firm may also issue grants when it 
experiences cash shortage. A more detailed discussion is in the next section. 
14 Alternatively, I could calculate the indirect impact based on the estimate of earnings coefficient in the 
total equity-based compensation model. I do not do so because earnings coefficient in the equity grants 
model differs dramatically from that in the equity holdings model, and a model that combines these two 
items provides poor estimate of the earnings coefficient. For the same reason, I calculate earnings impact 
on CEO total compensation by summing up the direct impact and the indirect impact estimated from 
separate compensation models. 
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5.3.   Empirical Test Results  Approach 2 
 
The sample used in the second approach drops to 11,310 observations from 
12,326 observations due to missing daily return data. In Panel A of Table 4, the mean 
EA_RET (NON_EA_RET) is 0.022 (0.162), indicating that EA_RET (NON_EA_RET) 
makes up 12% (88%) of total annual return. At the median these statistics are 16% and 
84%, respectively. The proportion of EA_RET is high given that EA_RET represents 
stock return to 5% of all the trading days during an average year.15 The distribution of 
NON_EA_RET is very similar to that of annual return and their correlation is 
between .94 and .96 (Panel B). Thus, NON_EA_RET seems to have preserved key 
features of annual stock returns. EA_RET is also positively correlated with annual return 
(Pearson correlation .20) although it is negatively correlated with NON_EA_RET 
(Pearson correlation -0.06). 
Before conducting the formal tests I first run a variance ratio analysis in the same 
spirit as Core et al. (2003). The numerator and denominator of the ratio are the variance 
of CEO compensation explained by EA_RET and the variance explained by 
NON_EA_RET, respectively. The higher the ratio, the greater explanatory power 
EA_RET possesses relative to NON_EA_RET, and hence the more important earnings 
news is to CEO compensation. I conduct the ratio analysis by CEO and require at least 
four valid observations for each CEO. The new sample is consisted of 7,760 
observations for about 1,300 CEOs. Panel C reports the distribution of the variance 
ratios. The median ratios for cash compensation, equity grants and total pay are 
                                                
15 The average number of trading days in a year is around 252 days.  
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above .80, indicating that the explanatory power of EA_RET is about 80% that of 
NON_EA_RET. The explanatory power of EA_RET in CEO equity holdings, CEO total 
equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation is about 20% that of 
NON_EA_RET. Overall, EA_RET explains a disproportionally large amount of CEO 
compensation variance compared to the 5% trading days it corresponds to.  
 Table 5 summarizes the results from the compensation regressions. As expected, 
NON_EA_RET is significantly positive in the univariate regression in all models. 
EA_RET is positive in CEO cash compensation in the univariate regression (.47, p-
value<.001), and remains significant in the multivariate regression after controlling for 
NON_EA_RET (.52, p-value<.001). The incremental R2 of EA_RET is 2.3% (8.2% 
minus 5.9%). EA_RET and NON_EA_RET are also significant to CEO equity grants and 
CEO total pay, although the explanatory powers of these models are lower (R2 1.7% for 
the equity grants model and 4.1% for the total pay model). In the model of CEO equity 
holdings EA_RET has a large positive coefficient in both the univariate regression (8.32) 
and the multivariate regression (11.08), and including EA_RET in the compensation 
model increases the R2 by 5.9%. The coefficient on EA_RET is 7.07 in the total equity-
based compensation model and 5.05 in the total compensation model and both 
coefficients are highly significant. The incremental R2s of EA_RET in these two models 
are 5.0% and 5.4%, respectively. Overall, results in Table 5 show that stock returns 
around earnings announcements are significant in explaining changes in CEO 
compensation conditional on stock returns on non-earnings announcement-days. 
Assuming that EA_RET is primarily driven by earnings news, these results support the 
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argument that accounting earnings are important to CEO equity-based compensation and 
CEO total compensation conditional on stock returns driven by non-earnings news. 
Table 6 reports the computation of the compensation impact of earnings based on 
the short-window ERC. The sample is consisted of 45,240 quarterly observations 
corresponding to the 11,310 CEO-year observations in Table 5. In Panel A, the mean 
(median) quarterly change in EPS (∆QE) is 0.003 (0.002). The standard deviation of 
∆QE is .034, around one fourth of the standard deviation of changes in annual EPS. The 
reported short-window ERC is the average the 48 ERCs estimated from quarterly cross 
section regressions. The mean is around .17 and is highly significant (p-value <.001).  
Panel B summarizes percentage and dollar changes of CEO compensation for a 
one-standard-deviation movement in earnings. Take the value change in CEO equity 
holdings for example, CUM_RET shifts by 0.006 (.17*.03446) in a quarter and .0235 in 
a year. Recall that the coefficient on EA_RET in the equity holdings model is 11.08 
(Table 5). Thus, the value of CEO equity holdings changes by 26.0% (11.08*0.0235) for 
a one-standard-deviation movement in earnings. This percentage change translates into a 
dollar change of $3.88 millions (.35 million) at the mean (median). A one-standard-
deviation movement in earnings shifts CEO cash compensation by 1.2%, or $17,000 
($12,000) at the mean (median).  These figures represent the direct impact of earnings 
on CEO compensation and appear economically insignificant. A one-standard-deviation 
movement in earnings shifts CEO equity grants and CEO total pay by 1.7% and 1.3%, 
respectively. The indirect impact of earnings is $3.93 millions at the mean and $.37 
million at the median with the majority impact coming from the value change in CEO 
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equity holdings. The impact of earnings on CEO total compensation amounts to $3.94 
millions at the mean or $.38 million at the median. While these figures are less dramatic 
than those from the first approach, they still represent a large portion of CEO total 
compensation and appear economically significant. 
5.4.  Robustness Tests 
5.4.1.  Time-series, firm specific regression 
 The pooled cross sectional regression forces the coefficient on earnings to be 
constant across the sample and does not allow for firm specific effects. To address this 
issue I repeat all tests using time-series firm specific regressions. The results support the 
inferences based on pooled cross sectional regressions and are reported in Table 7 
(Approach 1) and Table 8 (Approach 2). I require at least six valid observations for each 
firm which reduces the annual observations from 12,326 to 8,287 and the quarterly 
observations from 45,240 to 38,217. The number of firms drops from 2,376 to 911. 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the coefficient estimates of earnings and the filtered price. 
Earnings are significantly positive in all models except the equity grants model, in which 
case the coefficient is negative but insignificant (-10.86, p-value=.557). The R2s from 
the time series firm specific regressions are generally higher than those from the pooled 
regressions. Panel B and Panel C report the percentage changes and the dollar changes in 
CEO compensation for a movement of one standard deviation in earnings.16 The mean 
percentage changes for all models except equity grants are higher than those in the 
                                                
16 Note that unlike the pooled regression in Table 3 in which the percentage and dollar changes in CEO 
compensation are based on coefficient estimates in the compensation model, the percentage and dollar 
changes in Panel B and C are directly estimated in the time series, by firm regressions. Therefore, even 
though the mean coefficient estimate in the equity grants model is insignificant, the estimates of the 
percentage and dollar changes are significantly positive.  
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pooled regressions. For example, the percentage change is 14% for cash compensation 
and 152% for the value change in CEO equity holdings, as compared to 6.1% and 130% 
in the pooled regressions. In Panel C, the mean dollar changes of CEO cash, equity 
grants and total pay are between $216,000 and $369,000, which are larger than their 
counterparts in Table 3 ($146,000 and $271,000, respectively).  The median values in 
Panel C are also higher than those in Table 3 except for the equity grants model. Finally, 
the mean (median) dollar change of CEO equity holdings is $13.4 millions ($2.12 
millions), smaller (larger) than the corresponding value in the pooled regressions ($19.39 
millions and $1.77 millions).  
Table 8 reports the results of the second approach using time series data. The 
ERCs are estimated by firm and the mean (median) ERC is .51 (.17) with t-stat over 20 
and mean R2 around 5% (not reported). Panel A of Table 8 reports the coefficient 
estimates of EA_RET and NON_EA_RET. The values of these coefficients are 
comparable to those in the pooled regressions (Table 6) except for models of equity 
grants and CEO total pay where EA_RET is insignificant. Panel B reports the percentage 
changes in CEO compensation for a movement of one-standard-deviation in earnings. 
The mean percentage changes range from 2% to 5% for CEO total pay and total pay 
components, which are higher than those in the pooled regressions. The mean percentage 
changes of other compensation components are lower than those in the pooled 
regressions but are nevertheless significant. For example, the percentage change in CEO 
equity holdings is 17% as compared with 26% in the pooled regression. In Panel C, the 
dollar change of CEO compensation is $20,000 for cash compensation, $121,000 for 
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equity grants and $100,000 for total pay. These amounts are larger than those from the 
pooled regressions ($17,000, $48,000 and $59,000, respectively). The value change in 
CEO equity holdings is about $2 millions, lower than its counterpart in the pooled 
regression ($3.88 millions). Overall, results using time series firm specific regressions 
confirm conclusions based on pooled cross sectional regressions that accounting 
earnings are an economically significant determinant of CEO equity-based compensation 
and CEO total compensation.  
5.4.2.  Inconsistent signs of earnings, changes in earnings and stock returns 
 The impact of earnings valuation role on CEO compensation should be largely 
weakened when the direction of earnings news is inconsistent with that of stock returns. 
Specifically, when earnings news is negative it is unlikely to be informative about firms 
future cash flows (which are expected to be non-negative) and hence about firm value. 
On the other hand, when earnings news is positive but stock returns are negative it 
probably implies that factors other than earnings news play a more significant role in the 
markets assessment of firm value. Empirical evidence consistent with the above 
expectation will provide additional support to the indirect impact argument in the paper. 
Thus, I include an indicator variable (SIGN) in the compensation model and interact it 
with accounting earnings: 
 ∆Compi,t = f1 + f2* ∆Ei,t + f3* ∆Ei,t*SIGN i,t + f4* FPi,t + u1i,t                                                                  
Where tiComp ,∆ is the unexpected percentages in CEO compensation, ∆E is changes in 
EPS scaled by share price, FP is filtered price as estimated from Model (1), and SIGN=0 
if E>0, ∆E>0 and FP>0, or E<0, ∆E<0 andFP<0. SIGN=1 in all other cases. Regression 
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results (not reported) show that f2 is significantly positive and f3 is significantly negative 
in all compensation models. Therefore, earnings impact on CEO compensation is 
significantly lower when the direction of earnings news is opposite to that of stock 
returns. In addition, the absolute value of f3 is comparable to that of f2 for all 
compensation models except the equity holdings model in which case f2 is 13.1 whereas 
f3 is -7.8. These results suggest that accounting earnings do not play a significant role in 
CEO compensation when earnings valuation role is deemed less important or non-
existent.  
5.4.3.  Estimating the valuation role of earnings using both levels and changes of 
earnings 
 Model (1) and model (6) use changes in earnings as proxy for unexpected 
earnings news. However, prior literatures have shown that both levels and changes of 
earnings are relevant in estimating earnings valuation role using a return-earnings 
regression model (see Easton and Harris, 1991; Ali and Zarowin, 1992a,b for empirical 
evidence and Ohlson, 1991; Ohlson, 1995; Ohlson and Shroff, 1992 for theoretical 
argument). Thus, I re-estimate model (1) and model (6) by adding the levels of earnings 
in addition to the changes in earnings, and re-examine the compensation impact of 
earnings. My conclusion regarding the indirect impact and overall impact of earnings on 
CEO compensation remains unchanged based on these alternative models.    
5.4.4. Other measures of CEO compensation 
It is common to use logarithm of compensation values in empirical tests to 
control for the potential non-linear relation between compensation and performance 
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measures. Using logarithm also reduces estimation errors resulting from the skewness of 
compensation variables. To check the robustness of the main results which are based on 
percentage changes in CEO compensation I redefine CEO cash compensation, equity 
grants and total pay as the logarithm of the dollar values of these compensation items 
and repeat the pooled regression tests. Results (not reported) show that while the 
magnitudes of the coefficient on earnings change, they all remain significantly positive 
after controlling for the filtered price, supporting the main conclusion that earnings are 
an significant determinant of CEO total compensation.  
5.4.5. Other measures of accounting profitability  
Studies such as Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) and Murphy (1999) document 
that EPS and ROE are both popular performance measures used in CEO compensation 
contracts. I replicate all tests using the changes in ROE instead of the changes in EPS, 
and the conclusion remains unchanged.  
5.5.  By-Industry and By-Size Analysis of the Impact of Earnings on CEO Compensation 
Prior literature has provided rich evidence that CEO compensation structure 
varies by industries. For example, high-tech firms use equity-based compensation more 
extensively than other firms (Bebchuk and Grinstein, 2005; Ittner, Lambert and 
Larcker,2003; Murphy, 1999, 2003) whereas utility firms use the least amount of equity-
based compensation (Murphy, 1999). Firm size is another important determinant of CEO 
compensation structure. For example, Murphy (1999) shows that for CEOs of S&P 500 
firms with above-median market cap, cash compensation and option grants represent 
43% and 39% of CEO total pay, respectively, as compared to 60% and 31% for CEOs of 
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S&P 600 SmallCap. Therefore, I examine earnings impact on CEO compensation by 
industry and by firm size.  
5.5.1. By-industry analysis 
Murphy (1999) documents the CEO compensation structures of firms in utility 
industry and firms in financial services differ from those of firms in other industries. 
Recent studies also document differential pay structure of high-tech firms or new 
economy firms as compared with firms in traditional industries (Ittner, Lambert and 
Larcker, 2003; Murphy, 2003). Following Francis and Schipper (1999) and similar to 
Ittner et al (2003) and Murphy (2003), I define high-tech firms as those operating in 
computer hardware and software, telecommunication, and semiconductors. Thus I form 
four industry groups: utility (SIC 49), high-tech (three-digit SIC code: 283, 357, 360-368, 
481, 737, and 873), financial services (SIC 60-69) and others. Table 9 reports regression 
results of CEO compensation on earnings and filtered price for each of the four industry 
groups. 
 In the cash compensation model in Panel A, the earnings coefficient is highest 
for utility firms (1.70, p-value<.001) but lowest for high-tech firms (.19, p-value=0.02). 
Thus, accounting earnings play a more significant role in CEO cash compensation for 
utility firms than for high-tech firms. It is possible the high-tech firms rely more heavily 
on stock performance measures than on accounting profitability in designing their 
CEOs compensation contract, but the relatively small coefficient on the filtered price 
(.14 as compared to .24 to .26 for the other three groups) provides no evidence of this 
argument. On the other hand, Bushman, Indjejikian and Smith (1996) find that the use of 
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performance measures other than accounting earnings and stock returns increases with 
firms growth opportunities and product time horizon. Ittner, Larcker and Rajan (1997) 
also find that the use of non-financial performance measures (market share, 
efficiency/productivity, etc.) increases with the extent to which the firm follows an 
innovation-oriented strategy, the adoption of strategic quality initiatives and noise in 
financial measures. As innovation and long-term R&D investments are more critical to 
high-tech firms than to other firms, high-tech firms may rely more on non-financial 
performance measures than other firms do, resulting in the relatively low coefficients on 
earnings and stock returns. Furthermore, the standard deviation of earnings is the highest 
in the high-tech group (.19) but lowest in the utility group (0.06), consistent with firms 
assigning greater weight on earnings in CEO compensation when earnings are stable but 
less weight on earnings when earnings are volatile.  
 In the equity grants model earnings coefficient is only significant for other 
industries but insignificantly different from zero for firms in financial services, utility 
and high-tech industries. The R2s of the equity grants model are also relatively low 
compared with those from the cash compensation model. The lack of significance of 
accounting earnings in equity grants model is probably because firms issue stocks and 
options for reasons other than accounting profitability. The literature has identified a 
number of determinants of option grants. Firms may issue options to generate incentives 
(especially when firms have significant growth opportunities), relieve cash constraints, 
take advantage of tax rules, and attract and retain employees, or firms may issue options 
simply because the boards perceive options as a costless means of paying employees 
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(Ittner et al., 2003; Murphy, 2003; Core and Guay, 1999). This evidence indicates that 
equity grants may not be a pure compensation tool as salary and bonus and therefore we 
may not observe a significant association of accounting profitability and the value 
change in equity grants.17  
 In the model of value change of CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings, the 
utility group has the highest earnings coefficient (15.13, p-value<.001) and the financial 
services group has the lowest (5.14, p-value<.001). Recall that the value change of 
equity holdings is calculated as the (unexpected) returns on stocks and options 
multiplied by the number of stocks and options held by the CEO at the beginning of the 
year. Thus, unlike the value of equity grants, the actual changes in the numbers of stocks 
and options held by the CEO during the year do not play a role, and the differential 
magnitudes of earnings coefficient across industries are most likely due to differential 
valuation role of accounting earnings. That is, because accounting earnings may affect 
stock price differently across industries, earnings impact on CEO equity holdings may 
also vary across industries. This assumption is reasonable given that factors affecting 
earnings valuation role such as earnings persistence, systematic risks, and growth 
opportunities may be more similar for firms in the same industry than for firms across 
industries (refer to Kormendi and Lipe, 1987; Collins and Kothari, 1989; and Easton and 
Zmijewski, 1989 for analysis of various determinants of the ERC, which proxies for the 
valuation role of earnings). I use the ERC estimated from model (1) as a proxy for 
                                                
17 The magnitude of earnings coefficient in the equity grants model is also related to the sensitivity of 
options to stock price. To the extent that option sensitivity to stock price may differ across industries, the 
relative weight on earnings may also vary across industries. But I am not aware of studies examining this 
issue and I leave it to future research. 
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earnings valuation role. Consistent with this argument, the ERC (not reported) is 
highest for the utility group (1.35) and lowest for the financial services group (.45). 
 Panel B of Table 9 demonstrates the calculation of the percentage change in CEO 
compensation for a one-standard deviation change in accounting earnings. The first two 
columns are the earnings coefficient estimated from Panel A and the standard deviation 
of annual accounting earnings. The third column represents the percentage change in 
CEO compensation for a one-standard deviation movement in earnings. The fourth 
column documents the proportion of each type of compensation in total compensation. 
The last column shows the weighted percentage change in each type of compensation 
due to a one-standard deviation shift in earnings. The last row in this column reports the 
overall percentage change in CEO total compensation. The results show that earnings 
have the greatest impact on CEO total compensation for high-tech firms and the lowest 
impact for utility firms. CEO total compensation changes by 147% for high-tech 
industry but only by 24% for utility firms for a one standard deviation movement in 
earnings. The results are primarily driven by the high proportion of equity holdings of 
CEOs of high-tech firms; while the value change in equity holdings is 89% of CEO total 
compensation for high-tech firms, it is only 19% for utility firms. The small 
compensation impact of earnings for utility firms is also related to the lack of volatility 
of earnings of the industry. While the standard deviation of earnings is .19 for high-tech 
firms, it is only .06 for utility firms. Thus, even though accounting earnings receive a 
relatively large weight in CEO equity holdings model for utility firms (15.13) as 
compared to other firms, the small proportion of equity-based compensation and the lack 
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of earnings volatility prevent earnings to have an otherwise greater impact on CEO total 
compensation. The other group has the second highest percentage change in CEO total 
compensation (98%), followed by the financial services group (39%). While equity-
based compensation makes up 73% of CEO total compensation for firms in financial 
services, accounting earnings are relatively stable (standard deviation .10) and receive a 
relatively small weight (5.14) in the equity holdings compensation model. These two 
factors contribute to the relatively small impact of earnings on CEO total compensation 
for firms in financial services.  
5.5.2.  By-size analysis 
Table 10 reports the regression results of CEO compensation on earnings and the 
filtered price from four sub-samples based on firm size. Following Murphy (1999), I 
form four sub-samples which are S&P SmallCap 600, (SM), S&P MidCap 400 
(MD), S&P 500 below median market cap (SPB) and S&P 500 above median 
market cap (SPA). The median market cap of the sub-samples is $397 millions, $1.4 
billions, $3.6 billions and $13.7 billions, respectively (not reported). To check whether 
the by-size analysis overlaps with the by-industry analysis I examine the industry mix of 
each size sub-sample. The proportion of high-tech firms is similar across the size sub-
samples. The SM group and SPA group have the lowest and highest percentage of 
financial services firms, respectively (8% vs. 22%), and the SM group and the MD group 
have the lowest and highest percentage of utility firms (5% vs. 10%). In the cash 
compensation model in Panel A, the earnings coefficient is smallest for SM (.26, p-
value<.001) group but largest for MD group (1.31, p-value<.001). One potential cause of 
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the large (small) coefficient for MD (SM) group is probably the relatively high (low) 
proportion of utility firms in this group; as shown earlier, utility firms assign the highest 
weight on earnings in CEO cash compensation. Another explanation for the low earnings 
coefficient for small firms is that earnings are more volatile for small firms than for big 
firms, and therefore small firms rely less on earnings in designing their CEOs cash 
compensation in order to reduce the risks their CEO has to share. Consistent with this 
argument, the standard deviation of earnings is 0.21 for SM group but is between 0.07 
and 0.09 for the other three groups. Finally, to the extent that small firms experience 
losses more frequently than large firms, it is possible that small firms use criteria other 
than accounting profitability to determine their CEOs compensation. Descriptive 
statistics (not reported) show supportive evidence; SM firms have relatively low ROE 
(median 0.106) and high incidence of losses (21%) as compared to other groups (average 
median ROE .164, and average loss incidence 9.4%).18  
 In the equity grants model accounting earnings are not significantly different 
from zero for all groups except the SPB group, which represent S&P 500 firms with 
below median market cap. As discussed earlier, several factors may cause earnings 
coefficient in the equity grants model to differ across sub-samples. These factors include 
decisions to grant options for reasons other than firms financial performance 
(generating incentives, reserving cash, attracting and retaining employee, ignorance of 
the cost of issuing options, etc.), earnings differential impact on stock price (which 
                                                
18 Agency theory predicts that firms rely more on market-based rather than accounting-based performance 
measures when facing significant growth opportunities, which is often the case in small firms. Therefore 
the small weight on earnings for small firms is possibly due to their more significant growth opportunities. 
However, the descriptive statistics show that the book-to-market ratio (proxy for growth opportunities) of 
small firms is at least as large as that of the other groups, which is inconsistent with the argument. 
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translates into differential impact of earnings on the value of CEO stock holdings and 
equity holdings), and the sensitivity of option value to stock price (footnote 15). My 
analysis indicates that the most likely reason that SPB group but not other groups have a 
significantly positive earnings coefficient in the equity grants model is that accounting 
earnings play a more important valuation role for SPB group. Using ERC as a measure 
of earnings valuation role, I find that the ERC is highest for the SPB group (1.264) 
whereas the ERC is between .45 and 1.0 for the other groups. The differential impact of 
earnings on stock price also appears to explain the different magnitudes of earnings 
coefficient in the model of value change in CEO beginning-of-the-year equity holdings; 
the ERC is lowest (.453) for the SPA group but highest for the SPB group (1.264), 
consistent with the smallest (largest) earnings coefficient estimated from the SPB (SPB) 
group (5.00 and 14.03, respectively).  
 Panel B of Table 10 reports the percentage change in CEO compensation for 
each individual compensation item and for CEO total compensation, for a one-standard-
deviation movement in accounting earnings. First note that cash compensation 
contributes to around 10% of CEO total compensation for firms with all sizes. The 
proportion of equity grants is lowest in the SM group (1.5%) and highest in the SPB 
group (10%). The proportion of equity holdings varies between 68% and 77% across the 
sub-samples. A one-standard deviation movement in accounting earnings shifts CEO 
total compensation by 137% for SM group, 101% for SPB group, 74% for MD group 
and 25% for SPA groups. Thus, for a given change in accounting earnings, CEOs of 
small firms experience the largest percentage change whereas CEOs of the large S&P 
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firms see the smallest change in their total compensation. The relatively small (large) 
change in CEO compensation for SM (SPA) is probably due to two reasons. First, SM 
(SPA) group has the most (least) volatile earnings; the standard deviations of earnings in 
these two groups are .21 and .07, respective. Second, stock price is more sensitive to 
earnings news for small firms (ERC .852) than for SPA firms (ERC .453).  
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6.   RE-EXAMINATION OF THE SENSITIVITY-PRECISION TRADE-OFF 
HYPOTHESIS 
Up to this point, the study provides evidence that accounting earnings are an 
economically significant determinant of CEO total compensation. I am able to obtain 
such results by incorporating the effect of earnings valuation role on CEO 
compensation. To demonstrate the potential usefulness of this methodology, I re-
examine the classical trade-off hypothesis of agency theory. That is, in an optimal 
incentive contract, the weight on a performance measure increases with its relative 
sensitivity and its relative precision. The sensitivity refers to the change in a 
performance measure for a change in managerial efforts, and the precision refers to the 
lack of noise in the performance measure. While the precision is relatively easy to 
measure, the measurement of sensitivity is much less straightforward because it is 
unobservable. Nevertheless, it is generally believed that stock returns are more sensitive 
to managerial actions than accounting earnings because returns are more capable of 
reflecting the long-term consequence of current actions, which is especially important to 
firms with significant growth opportunities. Therefore, a testable hypothesis is that firms 
with significant growth opportunities place more weight on stock returns and less weight 
on accounting earnings in CEO compensation. I test the sensitivity vs. precision 
hypothesis using the following model which is similar to Core et al. 2003 except that I 
use the filtered price instead of the raw stock returns in the model. 19 
                                                
19 Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003) focus on the noise hypothesis (which is the same as the precision 
hypothesis) and include a proxy for firm growth in order to control for the sensitivity of the performance 
measures which may correlate with the noise factor. Therefore, in essence, the tests in Core et al. provide 
evidence on the sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis. 
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Where tiComp ,∆ is changes various measurements of CEO compensation as 
before, ∆E is changes in EPS scaled by share price, FP is filtered price, the residual term 
from model (1), BM is book-to-market ratio, measured as book value of equity 
(Compustat Item #60) over market value of equity at the end of year t.  
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EVar ∆  is the 
relative variance ratio, where Var(∆Ei) is the time series variance of ∆E, and Var(∆FPi) 
is the time series variance of the filtered price.  
The theory predicts earnings (stock return) to receive a lower (higher) weight 
when firms have significant growth opportunities, thus I expect e5 (e6) to be positive 
(negative), as a low BM implies more growth opportunities and hence less (more) weight 
on accounting earnings (stock returns). The theory predicts less (more) weight on 
earnings (stock returns) when the variance of earnings is large relative to the variance of 
stock returns. Thus, I expect e7 (e8) to be negative (positive). Results of Core et al. 2003 
generally confirm these predictions for CEO cash compensation but not for CEO total 
pay or CEO total compensation. They find that in the cash compensation model, stock 
returns and accounting earnings are significantly positive. In addition, accounting 
earnings receive less weight for firms with high growth and for firms with more volatile 
earnings relative to returns. The interactions of returns and growth and of returns and 
noise are insignificant. In the total pay model, only stock returns are significant; the rest 
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variables are all insignificant. In the total compensation model, stock returns are 
significantly positive, and receive a higher weight for growth firms. However, stock 
returns receive less weight when firms have more noise in their accounting earnings 
relative to stock returns, which is inconsistent with the agency prediction. Finally, 
accounting earnings, earnings interaction with book-to-market ratio, and earnings 
interaction with the noise ratio are all statistically insignificant in the total compensation 
model. Thus, Core et al. provide mixed evidence on the relative use of stock returns and 
no evidence on the relative use of accounting earnings for CEO total pay and total 
compensation.  
Table 11 reports regression results of model (8). First note that accounting 
earnings and the filtered price are significantly positive in all six CEO compensation 
models. The interaction of accounting earnings and BM has the correct sign for all six 
models and is statistically significant for four of them (cash compensation, equity 
holdings, total equity-based compensation and total compensation). These results are 
consistent with accounting earnings receiving less (more) weight in CEO compensation 
when the firm has more (less) growth opportunities. The interaction of the filtered price 
and the BM ratio has the correct sign (negative) and is statistically significant in the 
equity grants model, the total pay model, and the total compensation model. The 
interaction term is positive in the cash compensation model and the equity holdings 
model, and is statistically insignificant in the total equity-based compensation model.  
The interaction of earnings and the relative variance ratio is significantly 
negative in all models except in the equity holdings model where the coefficient is 
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insignificantly different from zero. Thus, as predicted by agency theory, firms assign a 
lower weight on accounting earnings in CEO compensation when the volatility of 
accounting earnings is high relative to stock returns. The interaction of the filtered price 
and the relative variance ratio is negative in all models except in the cash compensation 
model and the total pay model where the coefficient is insignificantly different from zero. 
The negative association means that firms assign less weight on stock returns when 
earnings are more volatile relative to stock returns. These results are against the 
prediction of agency theory but are consistent with the results of Core et al (Table 3, pp 
971). I perform an additional test to seek potential explanations to this negative 
association. Note that the least negative association occurs to cash compensation which 
does not include any equity-based compensation. The equity-based compensation is 
roughly the annual return multiplied by the number of shares held by the CEO.20 Thus, it 
is possible that the negative association between compensation and the variation ratio is 
due to the positive correlation of stock return and return variance. This correlation is 
plausible because firms with high stock returns are assumed to be more risky than firms 
with low stock returns, and the variance of stock returns can be viewed as a noisy proxy 
for the level of risks. As the return variance appears in the denominator of the relative 
variance ratio, it might cause a negative correlation between CEO compensation and the 
interaction of the filtered price and the relative noise ratio. Consistent with this argument, 
the Pearson correlation of stock return and its variance are significantly positive, and the 
relative noise ratio is negatively associated with the dependent variable in three out of 
                                                
20 The value of equity grants is based on Black-Scholes model. But the majority of the indirect impact 
comes from equity holdings so here the analysis focuses on determinants of the value of equity holdings.  
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the six models. However, adding return variance or other proxy of the firms risk level 
(firms beta as provided by CRSP) in model (8) does not change the results. I also repeat 
the analysis using realized growth in assets and realized growth in sales instead of the 
book-to-market ratio and the results remain unchanged. Therefore, the negative 
association remains a puzzle in this study and deserves future research.  
Overall, results in Table 11 provide strong evidence that firms rely less on 
accounting earnings when earnings are relatively more volatile and when firms have 
more growth opportunities. However, the results are weak and mixed regarding the use 
of stock returns. While there is some evidence that firms with significant growth 
opportunities assign more weight on stock returns, firms also appear to assign less 
weight on stock returns when earnings have high volatility relative to stock returns.   
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7.  CONCLUSION 
A substantial accounting literature has empirically examined the relative use of 
accounting earnings and stock returns in CEO compensation. However, the literature has 
largely focused on CEO cash compensation but ignored CEO equity-based 
compensation. As a result of the explosion of equity-based compensation in the past 
several decades, the variation in cash compensation has become minimal compared to 
the variation in equity-based compensation. This implies that no matter how important 
accounting earnings are to CEO cash compensation, its impact on CEO total 
compensation is unlikely to be significant. Consistent with this implication, studies find 
little association of earnings and CEO total pay or total compensation conditional on 
stock returns. The insignificant result makes it difficult to further test how the use of 
earnings and stock returns varies with hypothesized factors in the context of CEO total 
compensation. However, such tests are theoretically more relevant than tests based on 
cash compensation because agency theory identifies managerial wealth, not annual 
compensation as the key variable of concern to managers, and total compensation is used 
as a common proxy for CEO wealth in the finance and economics literatures. Unlike 
prior studies that attribute all variance in CEO equity-based compensation to price-based 
performance measures, the current paper argues that a portion of the price impact on 
compensation is attributable to accounting earnings because earnings news affects stock 
price (earnings valuation role). The paper investigates the impact of accounting 
earnings on CEO total compensation by measuring the joint effect of earnings 
contracting role and valuation role. It demonstrates that accounting earnings not only 
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have a direct impact on CEO cash compensation which has been traditionally viewed as 
earnings contracting role, but also an indirect impact on CEO equity-based 
compensation due to earnings valuation role. The paper shows that it is the indirect 
impact that makes accounting earnings an important determinant of CEO total 
compensation. To demonstrate the importance of incorporating the indirect impact, I re-
examine the classical sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis in CEO total compensation and 
provide evidence that firms assign less weight on accounting earnings when earnings are 
more volatile relative to stock returns and when firms have significant growth 
opportunities. I find little evidence that firms use stock returns in a manner consistent 
with the sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis.  
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Table 2 
Regression of CEO Compensation on Changes in EPS and Raw Stock Returns 
 
 
    Coefficient  t-stat  p-value   adj_R2 
Cash Compensation        
  Intercept  0.06  0.96  0.337    8.0 % 
  ∆E  0.25  3.87  0.000  ***   
  RET  0.21  16.68  0.000  ***   
            
Equity Grants        
  Intercept  (0.37)  (1.51)  0.132    1.8% 
  ∆E  (0.23)  (1.31)  0.190     
  RET  0.67  7.16  0.000  ***   
            
Value Change in CEO Beginning-of-the-year Equity Holdings 
  Intercept  (1.66)  (1.83)  0.067  **  83.3% 
  ∆E  (0.43)  (1.03)  0.304     
  RET  10.82  82.78  0.000  ***   
            
Total Pay          
  Intercept  (0.04)  (0.20)  0.840   4.2% 
  ∆E  0.00  0.00  0.998     
  RET  0.46  9.82  0.000  ***   
            
Total Equity-based Compensation      
  Intercept  (1.43)  (2.50)  0.012  **  67.7% 
  ∆E  (1.33)  (2.95)  0.003  ***   
  RET  6.94  52.26  0.000  ***   
            
Total Compensation        
  Intercept  (1.23)  (2.54)  0.011  **  71.2% 
  ∆E  (1.39)  (4.54)  0.000  ***   
  RET  4.91  50.80  0.000  ***   
 
Table 2 reports regression results of CEO compensation on the changes in EPS and raw stock returns. The 
sample consists of 12,326 CEO-year observations in ExecuComp database from 1993 to 2004. The 
regression model is: 
                                                                                                                     
  
where ∆comp is defined as cash compensation, equity grants, value change in CEO equity holdings, total 
pay, CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation, respectively. ∆E is the changes 
in EPS, and RET is annual stock returns (see Table 1 for definition of all variables). 
The regressions are pooled cross sectional regressions with year and SIC two digit industry indicators (not 
reported). The t-statistics and p-values are based on Roger's standard errors which control for serial 
correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percentiles to control for outliers.  
***, ** and * indicate significance (two-tailed t test) at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
uRETEComp tititi ++∆+=∆ ,,, γβα
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Table 3 
Regression of CEO Compensation on Changes in EPS and Filtered Price  
and Estimates of the Impact of Earnings on CEO Compensation 
 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics of filtered price and its correlation with selected variables 
 
(I) Distribution of the filtered price       
             
Mean  Std   Min  Q1  Median  Q3  Max 
0.00  0.49  (2.49)  (0.26)  (0.05)  0.17  4.36 
             
(II) Correlation with other variables       
    Pearson  Spearman   
variable  
  
Filtered 
Price 
 RET 
 
Filtered 
Price 
 RET 
  
∆E    0.00  0.24  0.18  0.34   
filtered price  1  0.91  1  0.85   
RET    0.91  1  0.85  1   
∆Cash  0.21  0.24  0.29  0.33   
∆Grants   0.10  0.10  0.11  0.10   
∆Equity-holdings  0.83  0.91  0.77  0.92   
∆Total_pay  0.15  0.16  0.19  0.21   
∆Total_equity  0.76  0.82  0.75  0.88   
∆Total_comp  0.78  0.84  0.75  0.88   
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Table 3 Continued, 
 
 
Panel B: Regression of CEO compensation on the changes in EPS and filtered price 
 
  Coefficient    t-stat  P-value  
Lower 
bound  
Upper 
bound  adj_R2 
             
Cash Compensation           
             
 intercept  0.09  1.38  0.167 *** (0.07)  0.26   7.5% 
 ∆E 0.43  6.68  0.000 *** 0.38   0.49    
 filtered price 0.20  15.49  0.000 *** 0.18   0.21    
             
Equity grants           
             
 intercept  (0.25)  (1.01)  0.312 *** (1.67)  1.17   1.7% 
 ∆E 0.37  2.22  0.026 ** (0.06)  0.79    
 filtered price 0.64  6.91  0.000 *** 0.52   0.77    
             
Value Change in CEO Beginning-of-the-year Equity Holdings   
             
 intercept  (0.02)  (0.02)  0.984  (1.02)  0.98   81.9% 
 ∆E 9.29  16.62  0.000 *** 8.94   9.63    
 filtered price 10.81  77.94  0.000 *** 10.71   10.91    
             
Total Pay           
             
 intercept  0.03  0.15  0.877 *** (0.50)   0.56   4.1% 
 ∆E 0.42  4.00  0.000 *** 0.23   0.60    
 filtered price 0.46  9.52  0.000 *** 0.40  0.51   
             
Total Equity-based Compensation        
             
 intercept  (0.37)  (0.66)  0.510 *** (1.33)  0.58   69.7% 
 ∆E 4.90  9.39  0.000 *** 4.57   5.23    
 filtered price 6.93  49.92  0.000 *** 6.83   7.02    
             
Total Compensation           
             
 intercept  (0.49)  (0.95)  0.341 *** (1.11)  0.13   70.8% 
 ∆E 3.02  8.78  0.000 *** 2.80   3.23    
 filtered price 4.90  47.26  0.000 *** 4.84   4.96    
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Table 3 Continued,  
 
 
Panel C:  Estimates of the impact of earnings on CEO compensation  
Percentage and dollar change in CEO compensation for a one-standard-deviation movement in earnings 
 
 
Coef 
on ∆E  
STD 
of 
∆E  
Percent Change 
in 
Compensation  
Expected 
compensation 
($millions)  
Dollar change in CEO 
Compensation ($millions) 
          Mean  Median  Mean   Median 
 (1)  (2)  (3)=(1)*(2)  (4)  (5)  (6)=(3)*(4)  (7)=(3)*(5) 
              
Cash Compensation          
 0.43  0.14  6.1%  1.41  0.98  0.085 a 0.059 
              
Equity Grants          
 0.37  0.14  5.2%  2.83  0.80  0.146 b 0.041 
              
Value Change in CEO Equity Holdings         
 9.29  0.14  130.0%  14.91  1.36  19.39 c 1.77 
              
CEO Total Pay           
 0.42  0.14  5.8%  4.65  2.18  0.271  0.127 
              
Total Equity-based Compensation         
 4.90  0.14      b+c 19.53  1.81 
              
Total Compensation           
 3.02  0.14      a+b+c 19.62  1.87 
 
 
The sample consists of 12,326 CEO-year observations in ExecuComp database from 1993 to 2004. 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics of the filtered price and its correlation with other key variables. The 
filtered price is the residual term (ei,t) from the following return-earnings model 
RETi,t = a0 + a1∆Ei,t + ei,t                                                                                      Model (1)                 
Panel B reports results from regressions of CEO compensation components on the changes in EPS and the 
filtered price.  
                                                                                                                  Model (2) 
where ei,t is the residual term from Model (1), and ∆comp is defined as cash compensation, equity grants, 
value change in CEO equity holdings, total pay, CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total 
compensation, respectively. 
The regressions in Panel A and Panel B are pooled cross sectional regressions with year indicators and 
SIC two digit code industry indicators (coefficients on which are not reported). The t-statistics and p-
values are based on Roger's standard errors which control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The 
lower and upper bounds are based on 95% confidence interval.          
Panel C reports the percentage and dollar change in CEO compensation for a one-standard deviation 
movement in earnings. Column (1) is copied from Panel B of Table 3. Column (2) is copied from Panel D 
of Table 1. Columns (4) and (5) are copied from Panel B of Table 1. 
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percentiles to control for outliers. All variables 
are as defined in Table 1.                 
***, ** and * indicate significance (two tailed t-test) at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.       
titititi uebEbbComp ,,2,10, ++∆+=∆
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics of Earnings-Announcement-Day Return and Non-Earnings-
Announcement-Day Return and Analysis of Variance Ratios  
 
 
Panel A:   Descriptive statistics of return components 
   N   Mean   Std   Min   Q1   Median  Q3   Max  
 EA_RET   11,310 0.022 0.140 (1.204) (0.047) 0.020 0.094  0.797 
 NON_EA_RET  11,310 0.162 0.517 (1.397) (0.121) 0.109 0.352  5.489 
          
 Panel B:   Pearson and spearman correlations of return components  
  NON_EA_RET    EA_RET  RET      
NON_EA_RET   (0.06)  0.96      
EA_RET  (0.07)    0.20      
RET  0.94  0.21        
            
 Panel C:   Variance ratios for CEO compensation components     
_STAT_  ∆Cash  
∆Grant
s  
∆Equity_
holdings  
∆Total_ 
pay  
∆Total_ 
equity  
∆Total_ 
comp 
             
N  1294   1158  1300 1298  1300   1300 
P10      0.028   0.028       0.007    0.031      0.009        0.010 
Q1        0.21      0.20         0.05     0.19        0.06         0.06 
MEDIAN        0.85      0.84         0.21      0.79        0.23         0.24 
Q3        3.50      4.00         0.51      3.54        0.61         0.59 
P90      22.37    26.92         0.87   22.78        1.10         1.02 
 
 
The sample in Panel A and Panel B consists of 11,310 CEO-year observations from the original sample that 
have valid daily return data around earnings announcements. CUM _RET is the three day (-1,0,1) 
cumulative raw stock returns around each earnings announcement as reported by CRSP. EA_RET is the sum 
of all CUM_RET during a firm's fiscal year. That is ∑
=
=
4
1
,,, __
j
jtiti RETCUMRETEA Model (5), where j 
represents quarters. 
NON_EA_RET is the difference between annual stock return and the EA_RET. i.e. NON_EA_RET = RET - 
EA_RET 
The sample in Panel C is consisted of 7,760 observations representing about 1,300 CEOs. Each CEO must 
have at least four valid continuous observations to be included in the sample.  
The numerator of the variance ratio is the variance of the predicted compensation from the following 
regression run for each CEO   
 ∆Compi,t = d0 + d2*EA_RETi,t + ui,t                                                        Model (4a) 
The denominator of the variance ratio is the predicted compensation from the following regression run for 
each CEO 
∆Compi,t = d0 + d1*NON_EA_RETi,t + ui,t                                               Model (4b)     
where ∆comp is defined as cash compensation, equity grants, value change in CEO equity holdings, total pay, 
CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation, respectively. 
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percentiles to control for outliers.  
All variables are as defined in Table 1. ***, ** and * indicate significance (two tailed t-test) at 1, 5 and 10 
percent respectively.       
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Table 5 
Regression of CEO Compensation on Earnings-Announcement-Day Return and 
Non-Earnings-Announcement-Day Return 
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable   Coef    t-stat   p-value  R2  
Incremen
tal R2 
            
Cash Compensation         
 Intercept       (0.02)       (0.27)  0.788  5.9%   
 NON_EA_RET d11        0.19       15.92  0.000 ***    
            
 Intercept         0.01         0.10  0.918  3.6%  2.3% 
 EA_RET d12        0.47       12.31  0.000 ***    
            
 Intercept       (0.02)  (0.26)  0.797  8.2%   
 NON_EA_RET d13        0.21       16.70  0.000 ***    
 EA_RET d14        0.52       14.12  0.000 ***    
            
Equity Grants          
 Intercept       (0.53)       (1.83)  0.067 * 1.6%   
 NON_EA_RET d21        0.63         6.73  0.000 ***    
            
 Intercept      ( 0.38)       (1.40)  0.162  0.7%  0.1% 
 EA_RET d22        0.53         2.03  0.043 **    
            
 Intercept       (0.53)       (1.87)  0.062 * 1.7%   
 NON_EA_RET d23        0.64         6.82  0.000 ***    
 EA_RET d24        0.72         2.70  0.007 ***    
          
Value Change in CEO beginning-of-the-year Equity Holdings    
 Intercept      (1.62)      (3.35) 0.001 *** 77.3%   
 NON_EA_RET d31      10.61      70.63 0.000 ***    
        
 Intercept       (0.21)      (0.21) 0.833  12.0%  5.9% 
 EA_RET d32        8.32      15.53 0.000 ***    
        
 Intercept      (1.56)    (2.34) 0.020 ** 83.2%   
 NON_EA_RET d33      10.83      72.13 0.000 ***    
 EA_RET d34      11.08      47.26 0.000 ***    
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Table 5 Continued,  
 
 
 
Independent  
Variable   Coef    t-stat   p-value  Adj_R2  
Incremen
tal R2 
            
Total Pay           
 Intercept       (0.30)        (3.50)  0.000 *** 3.9%   
 NON_EA_RET d41        0.45          9.02  0.000 ***    
            
 Intercept       (0.24)   (2.25)  0.025 *** 1.7%  0.2% 
 EA_RET d42        0.42          3.55  0.001 ***    
            
 Intercept       (0.30)        (3.71)  0.001 *** 4.1%   
 NON_EA_RET d43        0.46         9.27  0.000 ***    
 EA_RET d44        0.54          4.57  0.000 ***    
            
Total Equity-based Compensation       
 Intercept   (1.54)       (3.31)  0.000 *** 62.8%   
 NON_EA_RET d51        6.68       43.77  0.000 ***    
           
 Intercept      (0.65)       (0.74)  0.458  9.1%  5.0% 
 EA_RET d52        5.33       14.04  0.000 ***    
           
 Intercept      (1.51)      (3.19)  0.000 *** 67.8%   
 NON_EA_RET d53        6.82       44.82  0.000 ***    
 EA_RET d54        7.07       32.83  0.000 ***    
            
CEO Total Compensation         
 Intercept       (1.27)       (2.65)  0.008 *** 65.7%   
 NON_EA_RET d61        4.74       42.06  0.000 ***    
           
 Intercept      (0.64)       (0.79)  0.427  9.2%  5.4% 
 EA_RET d62        3.82  13.90  0.000 ***    
           
 Intercept       (1.24)      (2.56)  0.010 *** 71.1%   
 NON_EA_RET d63        4.85       42.76  0.000 ***    
 EA_RET d64        5.05       32.39  0.000 ***    
 
 
The sample is consisted of 11,310 observations from the original sample that have valid daily return data 
around earnings announcements. Table 5 reports results from regression of CEO compensation on 
earnings-announcement-day return and non-earnings-announcement-day return.   
 
∆Compi,t = d0 + d1*NON_EA_RETi,t + ui,t                                                  Model (4a)            
∆Compi,t = d0 + d2*EA_RETi,t + ui,t                                                            Model (4b)         
∆Compi,t = d0 + d3*NON_EA_RETi,t + d4*EA_RETi,t+ ui,t                         Model (4c) 
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Table 5 Continued,  
 
 
where ∆comp is defined as cash compensation, equity grants, value change in CEO equity holdings, total 
pay, CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation, respectively. 
 
CUM_RET is the three day (-1,0,1) cumulative raw stock returns around each earnings announcement as 
reported by CRSP. EA_RET is the sum of all CUM_RET during a firm's fiscal year. That is, 
 
∑
=
=
4
1
,,, __
j
jtiti RETCUMRETEA                                                                     Model (5) 
 
NON_EA_RET is the difference between annual stock return and the EA_RET. i.e. NON_EA_RET = 
RET - EA_RET 
The incremental R2 is calculated as the difference between the R2 of Model (4c) and Model (4a). 
 
The regressions are pooled cross sectional regressions with year and industry (SIC two digit code) 
indicators (coefficient estimates of which are not reported). The t-statistics and p-values are based on 
Roger's standard errors which control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
 
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percentiles to control for outliers.  
All variables are as defined in Table 1.  
***, ** and * indicate significance (two tailed t-test) at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.       
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Table 6 
Impacts of Earnings on CEO Compensation Estimated from Short-Window ERC 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of ∆QE and the short widow ERC estimate 
Descriptive Statistics of quarterly ∆QE 
 N MEAN STD MIN Q1 MEDEAN  Q3   MAX  
     45,240    0.003   0.03446  (0.316) (0.002)       0.002    0.006    0.525  
   STD    
Short-window ERC estimate   
   coef  t-stat  p-value  adj_R2 
 Intercept  0.005         5.05   0.000  1% 
 ∆QE  0.1704         7.40   0.000   
   ERC      
 
Panel B: Impact of earnings on CEO compensation - for one standard deviation of quarterly ∆QE 
 
     
Percentage 
change  
Value change ($ 
millions) 
Cash Compensation        
 effect of earnings on returns, per quarter  A=ERC*STD      0.006   mean  median 
 effect of earnings on returns, annual  B=A*4       0.0235     
 impact of earnings on cash compensation  C=B*d14       1.2%    0.017  a     0.012  
             
Equity Grants            
 effect of earnings on returns, per quarter  A=ERC*STD      0.006      
 effect of earnings on returns, annual  B=A*4       0.0235     
 impact of earnings on new grants   C=B*d24  1.7%   0.048  b     0.013  
             
Value Change in CEO Equity-holdings          
 effect of earnings on returns, per quarter  A=ERC*STD      0.006      
 effect of earnings on returns, annual  B=A*4       0.0235     
 impact of earnings on equity holdings  C=B*d34       26.0%    3.88  c     0.35  
            
Total Pay            
 effect of earnings on returns, per quarter  A=ERC*STD      0.006      
 effect of earnings on returns, annual  B=A*4       0.0235     
 impact of earnings on total pay   C=B*d44  1.3%   0.059       0.028  
             
Total Equity-based Compensation          
 effect of earnings on returns, per quarter  A=ERC*STD      
 effect of earnings on returns, annual  B=A*4       
 
impact of earnings on total equity-based 
compensation  C=B*d54  b+c   3.93       0.37  
             
Total Compensation           
 effect of earnings on returns, per quarter  A=ERC*STD      
 effect of earnings on returns, annual  B=A*4       
 impact of earnings on total compensation  C=B*d64  a+b+c   3.94       0.38  
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Table 6 Continued, 
 
 
The sample is consisted of 45,240 quarterly observations corresponding to the 11,310 annual observations 
in Table 5. Table 6 demonstrates the computation of the compensation impact of earnings for a one-
standard deviation of accounting earnings based on coefficients estimates in Table 5 as well as on estimate 
of a short window ERC.  
 
Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the changes in quarterly EPS (∆QE) and the short window 
ERC estimated from the following model: 
 
CUM_RETi,t,j = a0 + a1∆QEi,t,j + ei,t,j                                                            Model (6) 
 
where CUM_RETi,t,j is defined as the three day (-1,0,1) cumulative raw stock returns around the jth quarter 
earnings announcement for firm i in year t, and ∆QEi,t,j  is firm is jth quarter EPS (Compustat quarterly 
data item 19) in year t minus the EPS of the same quarter in year t-1, scaled by stock price at the end of the 
earlier quarter. The quarterly EPS and the stock price are adjusted for stock dividends and stock splits. 
 
The short-window ERC is based on quarterly cross sectional regressions. The reported ERC is the mean of 
the 48 quarterly ERCs, and the t-stat is calculated using the Fama-Macbeth method (Fama and Macbeth, 
1973). 
 
Panel B demonstrates the computation of the compensation impact of earnings using the ERC reported in 
Panel A and the coefficient estimates on EA_RET in Table 5 (d14 through d64). The compensation 
impact is presented in terms of the percentage and dollar changes in CEO compensation for a one-
standard-deviation movement in earnings.  
 
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percent to control for outliers. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1 
***, ** and * indicate significance (two tailed t-tests) at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively. 
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Table 7 
Regression of CEO Compensation on Changes in EPS and Filtered Price and 
Estimates of Earnings Impact on CEO Compensation (Firm Specific) 
 
 
Panel A:  Summary of Statistics of Earnings coefficient in the regression of CEO compensation on the 
changes in EPS and the filtered price - by firm 
 
 Coef 
(mean)   t_stat   prob  
 Coef 
(median )  R2  
Cash      5.02     13.68  0.000  ***         3.11  44% 
         
Equity Grants (10.86)    (0.59)  0.557        0.97  43% 
         
Value Change in CEO Beginning-
of-the-year-Equity Holdings   72.87   11.99  0.000  ***        33.83  89% 
         
Total Pay      4.28       2.38  0.017  **        2.61  38% 
         
Total Equity-based Compensation    51.46    11.45  0.000  ***     19.95  82% 
         
Total Compensation    39.50  10.58  0.000  ***      13.20  82% 
 
Panel B: Mean/median percentage change in CEO compensation for a one-standard-deviation movement 
in earnings  - estimated from by firm 
  mean   t_stat  prob   median  
Cash 14%      23.29 0.000  ***  11% 
      
Equity Grants 14%        3.67 0.000  ***  3% 
      
Value Change in CEO Beginning-of-
the-Year Equity Holdings 152%     20.32 0.000  ***  132% 
      
Total Pay 10%        8.41 0.000  ***  11% 
      
Total Equity-based Compensation 98%      19.53 0.000  ***  83% 
      
Total Compensation 69%      20.29 0.000  ***  55% 
 
Panel C: Mean/median value change in CEO compensation for a one-standard-deviation movement in 
earnings  estimated by firm ($ millions) 
  mean    t_stat  prob   median  
Cash      0.216 a    16.05 0.000 ***      0.118 
       
New Equity Grants      0.354 b      2.86 0.004 ***      0.013 
       
Value Change in CEO Beginning-
of-the-Year Equity Holdings        13.43 c     7.63 0.000 *** 
 
2.12 
       
Total Pay      0.369       4.86 0.000 ***      0.222 
       
Total Equity-based Compensation      13.78 b+c      7.67          2.36 
       
Total Compensation      13.80 a+b+c      7.62          2.58 
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Table 7 Continued, 
 
 
The sample consists of 8,782 CEO-year observations representing 911 firms in ExecuComp database from 
1993 to 2004. Each firm in the sample has at least six continuous firm-year observations. 
 
Panel A reports results from time series firm specific regressions of CEO compensation components on 
the change in EPS and the filtered price. 
 
                                                                                                                  Model (2) 
where ei,t is the residual term from Model (1): RETi,t = a0 + a1∆Ei,t + ei,t ,                                                                      
and ∆comp is defined as cash compensation, equity grants, value change in CEO equity holdings, total pay, 
CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation, respectively. 
 
Panel B and Panel C report the percentage and dollar changes in CEO compensation for a one-standard 
deviation movement in earnings based on time series firm specific regression. The t-statistics and p-values 
are based on the distribution of the 911 by-firm estimates.  
 
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percentiles to control for outliers.        
All variables are as defined in Table 1.                 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent (two tailed t-test), respectively.       
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Table 8 
Regression of CEO Compensation on Earnings-Announcement-Day Return and 
Non-Earnings-Announcement-Day Return and  
Estimates of Earnings Impact on CEO Compensation (Firm Specific) 
 
 
Panel A: Time series firm-specific regression of CEO compensation on earnings-announcement-day return 
and non-earnings-announcement-day return 
 Dep. Var.  mean   t_stat  Prob. median  R2 
Cash EA_RET   0.57      7.22 0.000      0.46  37% 
 NON_EA_RET   0.29    12.42 0.000      0.21   
       
Equity Grants EA_RET (1.61)     (0.65) 0.519      0.11  42% 
 NON_EA_RET   0.63      2.62 0.009      0.12   
       
EA_RET 12.09     34.43 0.000    11.54  89% Value Change in CEO 
Equity Holdings NON_EA_RET 12.30     86.77 0.000    11.57   
       
Total Pay EA_RET   0.31      1.34 0.182       0.56  82% 
 NON_EA_RET  0.34      5.16 0.000       0.28   
       
Total Equity-based EA_RET  7.93    21.75 0.000       8.42  81% 
Compensation NON_EA_RET  7.76    63.92 0.000       7.94   
       
Total Compensation EA_RET  5.17     27.33 0.000       5.35  34% 
 NON_EA_RET  5.18     60.32 0.000       4.94   
 
Panel B: Mean/median percentage change in CEO compensation for a one-standard-deviation movement 
in earnings  estimated by firm 
   mean t_stat  probt   median  
Cash   2% 6.48  0.000 *** 1% 
Equity Grants   5% 2.23  0.026 ** 12% 
Value Change in CEO Beginning-of-
the-Year Equity Holdings 17% 7.25  0.000 ***       0% 
Total Pay   2% 2.64  0.008 *** 1% 
Total Equity-based Compensation 14% 7.91  0.000 ***       7% 
Total Compensation   10% 8.34  0.000 *** 4% 
 
Panel C: Mean/median value change in CEO compensation for a one-standard deviation movement in 
earnings  estimated by firm ($millions) 
   mean  t_stat probt   median  
Cash            .020 a 4.58 0.000  ***        .005 
Equity Grants          .121 b 1.56 0.118          .002 
Value Change in CEO Beginning-of-
the-Year Equity Holdings     1.99 c 4.94 0.000  ***       .169 
Total Pay            .100  1.51 0.132          .009 
Total Equity-based Compensation     2.11 b+c           .169 
Total Compensation       2.13 a+b+c           .174 
 
  
96
Table 8 Continued, 
 
 
The sample is consisted of 38,217 quarterly observations representing 911 firms that have at least six 
continuous firm-year observations from 1993 to 2004. Panel A reports results from by-firm regressions of 
CEO compensation on earnings-announcement-day return and non-earnings-announcement-day return.  
 
∆Compi,t = d0 + d1*NON_EA_RETi,t + ui,t                                                  Model (4a)            
∆Compi,t = d0 + d2*EA_RETi,t + ui,t                                                            Model (4b)         
∆Compi,t = d0 + d3*NON_EA_RETi,t + d4*EA_RETi,t+ ui,t                         Model (4c) 
 
where  ∆comp is defined as cash compensation, equity grants, value change in CEO equity holdings, total 
pay, CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation, respectively. 
 
 
CUM_RET is the three day (-1,0,1) cumulative raw stock returns around each earnings announcement. 
EA_RET is the sum of all CUM_RET during a firm's fiscal year. That is, 
 
∑
=
=
4
1
,,, __
j
jtiti RETCUMRETEA                                                                     Model (5) 
 
NON_EA_RET is the difference between annual stock return and the EA_RET. i.e. NON_EA_RET = 
RET - EA_RET 
 
Panel B and Panel C report the percentage and dollar changes in CEO compensation for a one-standard 
deviation movement in earnings based on time series firm specific regression. The t-statistics and p-values 
are based on the distribution of the 911 by-firm estimates.  
 
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percentiles to control for outliers. 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent (two tailed t-test), respectively. 
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Table 9 
Regression of CEO Compensation on Changes in EPS and Filtered Price  
- by Industry Analysis 
 
Panel A: Regression of CEO Compensation on the Changes in Earnings and Filtered Price 
     ∆Cash  ∆Equity Grants  ∆Equity Holdings 
    coef t-stat  coef t-stat  coef t-stat  
Financial Services           
  ∆E    0.69   1.75  *      (0.15)  (0.32)       5.14     2.43  **  
  FP    0.24   4.41 ***        0.98     2.79 ***    10.43   16.07 *** 
  R2  5.0%  0.9%   76.7%   
High-Tech         
  ∆E    0.19    2.30  **         0.07     0.25       8.56     8.17 *** 
  FP    0.14    6.95 ***        0.56     4.25 ***    10.35   56.51 *** 
  R2  5.9%  2.1%   85.0%   
Other           
  ∆E    0.52    5.65 ***        0.58     2.69 ***      9.88   16.98 *** 
  FP    0.26  15.50 ***        0.66     4.59 ***    11.27   54.75 *** 
  R2  10.3%  1.3%   82.1%   
Utility           
  ∆E    1.70    7.04 ***        1.24     0.82     15.13     6.51 *** 
  FP    0.26    3.66 ***        1.90     2.52 ***    10.24     5.08 *** 
  R2  14.0%  5.8%   63.0%   
 
 
Panel B:  Percentage Change in CEO Compensation for a One-Standard-Deviation Movement in Earnings 
 
  
Coef on 
∆E STD 
% change for 
one STD shift 
in Earnings 
Proportion in 
CEO total 
compensation 
% change in 
CEO total 
compensation 
  (1) (2) (3)=(1)*(2) (4) (5)=(3)*(4) 
Fin. Serv. Cash       0.69 0.10 6.9% 11.2% 0.8% 
 Equity Grants     (0.15) 0.10 -1.5% 6.9% -0.1% 
 Equity Holdings       5.14 0.10 51.9% 73.4% 38.1% 
      38.8% 
High-tech Cash       0.19 0.19 3.6% 3.0% 0.1% 
 Equity Grants       0.07 0.19 1.4% 2.7% 0.0% 
 Equity Holdings       8.56 0.19 164.6% 89.3% 146.9% 
      147.1% 
Other Cash       0.52 0.13 7.0% 11.3% 0.8% 
 Equity Grants       0.58 0.13 7.7% 5.4% 0.4% 
 Equity Holdings       9.88 0.13 132.7% 72.9% 96.8% 
     98.0% 98.0% 
Utility Cash       1.70 0.06 10.6% 48.3% 5.1% 
 Equity Grants     1.24 0.06 7.7% 10.1% 0.8% 
 Equity Holdings     15.13 0.06 94.3% 18.9% 17.8% 
      23.7% 
 
  
98
Table 9 Continued, 
 
 
The sample consists of 12,326 CEO-year observations in ExecuComp database from 1993 to 2004. 
 
Panel A reports results from regressions of CEO compensation components on the changes in EPS and the 
filtered price.  
 
                                                                                                                  Model (2) 
where ei,t , the proxy of filtered price, is the residual term from Model (1): RETi,t = a0 + a1∆Ei,t + ei,t  and 
∆comp is defined as cash compensation, equity grants, value change in CEO equity holdings, total pay, 
CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation, respectively. RET and ∆E are annual 
raw stock returns and changes in annual earnings. For detailed description of the variables refer to Table 1.  
 
The regressions are run separately for four sub-samples based on industry. These are utility group (two 
digit SIC code = 49), high tech group (three-digit SIC code including 283 Drugs, 357 Computer and 
Office Equipment, 360 Electrical Machinery and Equipment, Excluding Computers, 361 Electrical 
Transmissions and distribution Equipment, 362 Electrical Industrial Apparatus, 363 Household 
Appliances, 364 Electrical Lighting and Wiring Equipment, 365 Household Audio, Video Equipment, 
Audio Receiving, 366 Communication Equipment, 367 Electronic Components, Semiconductors 368 
Computer Hardware (Including Mini, Micro, Mainframes, Terminals, Discs, Tape Drives, Scanners, 
Graphics Systems, Peripherals, and Equipment), 481 Telephone Communications, 737 Computer 
Programming, Software, Data Processing 873 Research, Development, Testing Services), financial 
services group (one digit SIC code=6), and others group (firms not belonging to any of the first three 
groups). 
 
The regressions are pooled cross sectional regressions with year indicators and SIC two digit code industry 
indicators (coefficients on which are not reported). The t-statistics and p-values are based on Roger's 
standard errors which control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
 
Panel C reports the percentage and dollar change in CEO compensation for a one-standard deviation 
movement in earnings. Column (1) is copied from Panel A. Column (2) reports the standard deviation of 
earnings for each sub-sample. Column (4) reports the proportion of each type of compensation in CEO 
total compensation. The reported percentage is the mean value calculated from each sub-sample. Column 
(5) reports the weighted percentage change in each type of compensation for a one-standard deviation 
movement in earnings. 
 
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percentiles to control for outliers.  
All variables are as defined in Table 1.                 
***, ** and * indicate significance (two tailed t-test) at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.       
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Table 10 
Regression of CEO Compensation on Changes in EPS and Filtered Price  
- by Size Analysis 
 
Panel A: Regression of CEO Compensation on the Changes in Earnings and Filtered Price 
    ∆Cash  ∆Equity Grants ∆Equity Holdings 
 stat  coef t-stat  coef t-stat  coef t-stat  
S&P 600 SmallCap          
 ∆E  0.26  4.60 *** 0.20 1.17  8.46  13.14  *** 
 FP  0.17  10.31 *** 0.69 4.63  10.98  57.05  *** 
 R2  7.8%   1.4%  87.1%   
S&P 400 MidCap         
 ∆E  1.31  5.72 *** 0.42 0.64  12.09  10.15  *** 
 FP  0.21  9.77 *** 0.50 3.89 *** 11.05  52.98  *** 
 R2  11.5%   0.5%  80.7%   
S&P 500 - below median       
 ∆E  0.99  4.15 *** 1.31 1.99  14.03  11.87  *** 
 FP  0.23  7.33 *** 0.93 3.75 *** 10.22  26.90  *** 
 R2  10.4%   4.7%  78.6%   
S&P 500 - above median       
 ∆E  0.75  1.41  (0.11) (0.20)  5.00  1.40   
 FP  0.23  5.71 *** 0.32 1.11  10.13  24.53  *** 
 R2  5.2%   2.8%  66.9%  
 
 
Panel B:  Percentage Change in CEO Compensation for a One-Standard-Deviation Movement in Earnings 
 
  
Coef 
on ∆E STD 
% change 
for one 
STD shift 
in Earnings 
Proportion in 
CEO total 
compensation 
% change in 
CEO total 
compensation 
  (1) (2) (3)=(1)*(2) (4) (5)=(3)*(4) 
S&P 600 Cash    0.26 0.21  5.5% 11.2% 0.6% 
SmallCap Equity Grants    0.20 0.21  4.3% 1.5% 0.1% 
 Equity Holdings    8.46 0.21  176.9% 76.8% 135.9% 
      136.6% 
S&P 400 Cash    1.31 0.08  10.6% 11.3% 1.2% 
MidCap Equity Grants    0.42 0.08  3.5% 5.4% 0.2% 
 Equity Holdings  12.09 0.08  98.4% 73.3% 72.1% 
      73.5% 
S&P 500 cash    0.99 0.10  9.7% 10.1% 1.0% 
Below median equity    1.31 0.10  12.9% 8.7% 1.1% 
 holding  14.03 0.10  137.8% 71.7% 98.8% 
      100.9% 
S&P 500 Cash    0.75 0.07  5.3% 9.4% 0.5% 
- above median Equity Grants (0.11) 0.07  -0.8% 10.0% -0.1% 
 Equity Holdings    5.00 0.07  35.3% 69.5% 24.5% 
      24.9% 
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Table 10 Continued, 
 
 
The sample consists of 12,326 CEO-year observations in ExecuComp database from 1993 to 2004. 
 
Panel A reports results from regressions of CEO compensation components on the changes in EPS and the 
filtered price.  
 
                                                                                                                  Model (2) 
where ei,t , the proxy of filtered price, is the residual term from Model (1): RETi,t = a0 + a1∆Ei,t + ei,t  and 
∆comp is defined as cash compensation, equity grants, value change in CEO equity holdings, total pay, 
CEO total equity-based compensation and CEO total compensation, respectively. RET and ∆E are annual 
raw stock returns and changes in annual earnings. For detailed description of the variables refer to Table 1.  
 
The regressions are run separately for four sub-samples based on firm size. These are S&P 600 SmallCap 
firms (SM) S&P 400 MidCap firms (MD), S&P 500 with market cap below the median (SPB) and S&P 
500 with market cap above the median (SPA). 
The regressions are pooled cross sectional regressions with year indicators and SIC two digit code industry 
indicators (coefficients on which are not reported). The t-statistics and p-values are based on Roger's 
standard errors which control for serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.  
 
Panel C reports the percentage and dollar change in CEO compensation for a one-standard deviation 
movement in earnings. Column (1) is copied from Panel A. Column (2) reports the standard deviation of 
earnings for each sub-sample. Column (4) reports the proportion of each type of compensation in CEO 
total compensation. The reported percentage is the mean value calculated from each sub-sample. Column 
(5) reports the weighted percentage change in each type of compensation for a one-standard deviation 
movement in earnings. 
 
All variables are winsorized at the top and the bottom 0.5 percentiles to control for outliers.  
All variables are as defined in Table 1.                 
***, ** and * indicate significance (two tailed t-test) at 1, 5 and 10 percent respectively.
titititi uebEbbComp ,,2,10, ++∆+=∆
  
101
Ta
bl
e 
11
  
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
of
 C
EO
 C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
on
 C
ha
ng
es
 in
 E
PS
, F
ilt
er
ed
 P
ri
ce
, a
nd
 H
yp
ot
he
siz
ed
 D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
 
 
 
 
∆E
 
 
FP
 
 
B
M
 
 
V
A
R
 
 
∆E
 *
BM
 
FP
 *
BM
 
∆E
 
*V
A
R
 
 
FP
 *
V
A
R
 
 
R
2 
Pr
ed
ic
te
d 
Si
gn
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
? 
 
? 
 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
as
h 
C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
oe
f 
0.
80
 
 
0.
15
 
 
0.
03
 
 
0.
01
 
 
0.
30
 
 
0.
13
 
 
(0
.2
3)
 
 
(0
.0
2)
 
 
9.
1%
 
 
t-s
ta
t 
5.
98
 
 
8.
55
 
 
1.
61
 
 
0.
59
 
 
2.
64
 
 
3.
31
 
 
(2
.9
3)
 
 
(0
.7
4)
 
 
 
 
p-
va
lu
e 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.1
07
 
 
.5
53
 
 
.0
08
 
**
* 
.0
01
 
**
* 
.0
03
 
**
* 
.4
58
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
qu
ity
 G
ra
nt
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
oe
f 
0.
78
 
 
0.
98
 
 
(0
.2
8)
 
 
0.
02
 
 
0.
01
 
 
(0
.7
6)
 
 
(0
.3
0)
 
 
(0
.3
6)
 
 
2.
1%
 
 
t-s
ta
t 
1.
95
 
 
6.
06
 
 
(2
.5
1)
 
 
0.
40
 
 
0.
03
 
 
(3
.2
9)
 
 
(2
.2
2)
 
 
(4
.3
7)
 
 
 
 
p-
va
lu
e 
.0
51
 
**
 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
12
 
**
 
.6
92
 
 
.9
76
 
 
.0
01
 
**
* 
.0
27
 
**
 
.0
00
 
# 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V
al
ue
 C
ha
ng
e 
in
 C
EO
 B
eg
in
ni
ng
-o
f-t
he
-y
ea
r 
E
qu
ity
 H
ol
di
ng
s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
oe
f 
10
.9
3 
 
10
.4
2 
 
1.
07
 
 
(0
.2
4)
 
 
4.
26
 
 
2.
16
 
 
(0
.9
6)
 
 
(0
.7
5)
 
 
81
.1
%
 
 
t-s
ta
t 
7.
97
 
 
44
.4
0 
 
6.
85
 
 
(3
.7
4)
 
 
3.
97
 
 
5.
49
 
 
(1
.0
9)
 
 
(3
.0
9)
 
 
 
 
p-
va
lu
e 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.2
76
 
 
.0
02
 
# 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
ot
al
 P
ay
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
oe
f 
0.
47
 
 
0.
65
 
 
(0
.2
7)
 
 
0.
03
 
 
0.
12
 
 
(0
.4
5)
 
 
(0
.1
7)
 
 
(0
.1
4)
 
 
5.
1%
 
 
t-s
ta
t 
1.
97
 
 
7.
55
 
 
(5
.2
3)
 
 
0.
99
 
 
0.
66
 
 
(3
.8
8)
 
 
(1
.6
6)
 
 
(1
.6
0)
 
 
 
 
p-
va
lu
e 
.0
49
 
**
 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.3
23
 
 
.5
06
 
 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
96
 
* 
.1
09
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
ot
al
 E
qu
ity
-b
as
ed
 C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
oe
f 
6.
27
 
 
7.
04
 
 
0.
49
 
 
(0
.1
2)
 
 
2.
73
 
 
0.
68
 
 
(1
.4
3)
 
 
(0
.8
3)
 
 
66
.6
%
 
 
t-s
ta
t 
6.
33
 
 
32
.0
6 
 
2.
74
 
 
(2
.1
0)
 
 
3.
51
 
 
1.
46
 
 
(1
.9
4)
 
 
(2
.3
1)
 
 
 
 
p-
va
lu
e 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
06
 
**
* 
.0
36
 
**
 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.1
44
 
 
.0
52
 
**
 
.0
21
 
# 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
ot
al
 C
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C
oe
f 
4.
18
 
 
5.
28
 
 
(0
.0
5)
 
 
(0
.0
8)
 
 
1.
21
 
 
(0
.5
8)
 
 
(0
.9
4)
 
 
(0
.7
5)
 
 
70
.0
%
 
 
t-s
ta
t 
6.
27
 
 
32
.5
2 
 
(0
.5
0)
 
 
(2
.1
4)
 
 
2.
29
 
 
(2
.0
6)
 
 
(2
.2
3)
 
 
(4
.3
7)
 
 
 
 
p-
va
lu
e 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.0
00
 
**
* 
.6
19
 
 
.0
33
 
**
 
.0
22
 
**
 
.0
40
 
**
 
.0
26
 
**
 
.0
00
 
# 
 
 
 
  
102
Ta
bl
e 
11
 C
on
tin
ue
d,
 
  Th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
is
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
10
,6
55
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
 fr
om
 th
e 
or
ig
in
al
 sa
m
pl
e 
th
at
 h
av
e 
va
lid
 d
at
a 
to
 c
al
cu
la
te
 b
oo
k-
to
-m
ar
ke
t r
at
io
 a
nd
 th
e 
re
la
tiv
e 
no
is
e 
ra
tio
. 
Th
e 
ra
tio
 is
 m
ea
su
re
d 
as
 th
e 
tim
e-
se
rie
s v
ar
ia
nc
e 
of
 ∆
E 
sc
al
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
tim
e-
se
rie
s v
ar
ia
nc
e 
of
 F
P 
(fi
lte
re
d 
pr
ic
e)
. T
he
 ra
tio
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
fo
r e
ac
h 
fir
m
 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
m
os
t r
ec
en
t1
0 
ye
ar
s (
8 
ye
ar
s m
in
im
um
) d
at
a 
of
 st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
s a
nd
 E
PS
. T
ab
le
 8
 p
re
se
nt
s r
es
ul
ts 
of
 M
od
el
 (8
) 
t
i
ii
t
i
ii
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
ii
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
u
FP
Va
r
E
Va
r
FP
e
FP
Va
r
E
Va
r
E
e
BM
FP
e
BM
E
e
FP
Va
r
E
Va
r
e
BM
e
FP
e
E
e
e
C
om
p
,
,
8
,
7
,
,
6
,
,
5
4
,
3
,
2
,
1
0
,
)
(
)
(
*
)
(
)
(
*
*
*
)
(
)
(
+
∆
+
∆
∆
+
+
∆
+
∆
+
+
+
∆
+
=
∆
 
w
he
re
 ∆
co
m
p 
is
 d
ef
in
ed
 a
s c
as
h 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n,
 e
qu
ity
 g
ra
nt
s, 
va
lu
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 C
EO
 e
qu
ity
 h
ol
di
ng
s, 
to
ta
l p
ay
, C
EO
 to
ta
l e
qu
ity
-b
as
ed
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
an
d 
C
EO
 to
ta
l c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n,
 re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 T
he
 re
gr
es
si
on
s a
re
 p
oo
le
d 
cr
os
s s
ec
tio
na
l r
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 w
ith
 y
ea
r a
nd
 in
du
str
y 
(S
IC
 tw
o 
di
gi
t) 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
(c
oe
ffi
ci
en
ts
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 n
ot
 re
po
rte
d)
. T
he
 t-
sta
tis
tic
s a
nd
 p
-v
al
ue
s a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
Ro
ge
r's
 st
an
da
rd
 e
rr
or
s w
hi
ch
 c
on
tro
l f
or
 se
ria
l c
or
re
la
tio
n 
an
d 
he
te
ro
sc
ed
as
tic
ity
.  
 A
ll 
va
ria
bl
es
 a
re
 w
in
so
riz
ed
 a
t t
he
 to
p 
an
d 
th
e 
bo
tto
m
 0
.5
 p
er
ce
nt
ile
s t
o 
co
nt
ro
l f
or
 o
ut
lie
rs
.  
A
ll 
ot
he
r v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 a
s d
ef
in
ed
 in
 T
ab
le
 1
.  
**
*,
 *
* 
an
d 
* 
in
di
ca
te
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
(tw
o 
ta
ile
d 
t-t
es
t) 
at
 1
, 5
 a
nd
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
   
  
#:
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 d
iff
er
en
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
si
gn
.  
  
103
 
VITA 
 
 
Name   Ying Cao  
Address Texas A&M University, Mays Business School, Department of 
Accounting, 4353 TAMU, College Station, TX 77843 
 
Email Address yingcao@tamu.edu  
Education:  B.A., Accounting, Renmin University of China, 1996 
M.S., Accounting, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2002  
Ph.D., Accounting, Texas A&M University, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
